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FEAR AND LOATHING: SHAME, SHAMING, AND
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
Elizabeth L. Rosenblatt*
INTRODUCTION
Shame is civilizing.  It is the governing drive of conscience; if people
had no shame, the rule of law would lose much of its power, and might
would often mean right.  Shaming—the public attempt to impose
shame on others—is an equally important driver of behavior.  People
strive to avoid humiliation and the loss of reputation; we steer clear of
“bad” behaviors even if they would benefit us.  In the words of Seneca
the Younger, “Shame can forbid sometimes what the law does not.”1
Shame and shaming are crucial to our understanding of intellectual
property law and norms, and yet they have gone largely unexplored in
the intellectual property literature.  Many scholars have examined in-
tellectual property norms and how they interact with the law.2   But it
is not enough to point out that someone acts a certain way because of
norms; we must also understand the motivational forces that drive
people to conform.  In the criminal and tax law contexts, scholars have
paid ample attention to the role of shame and shaming in governing
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Law.  For their insights and input, I would like to thank Annemarie Bridy; Chris Buccafusco;
Adam Candeub; Stewart Chang; Eric Goldman; Leah Chan Grinvald; Cynthia Ho; Eric E. John-
son; Edward Lee; Manoj Mate; Dotan Oliar; Lisa Ramsay; Al and Julie Rosenblatt; Wendy
Rosenstein; Chris Sprigman; Ethan Zuckerman; the participants at the 2012 Intellectual Prop-
erty Scholars’ Conference; the participants at the 2013 Chicago IP Colloquium; and the partici-
pants at the 2013 WIPIP Conference.
1. LUCIUS ANNAEUS SENECA, TROJAN WOMEN (TROADES), reprinted in 1 SENECA: THE
TRAGEDIES 1, 14 (David R. Slavitt & Palmer Bovie eds., 1992).
2. Much of this literature discusses norms as they relate to fields outside the scope of formal
intellectual property. See infra notes 4–19 and sources cited therein.  Another strand explores
the relationship between norms and existing formal law. See, e.g., Jennifer E. Rothman, The
Questionable Use of Custom in Intellectual Property, 93 VA. L. REV. 1899, 1905–06 (2007) (dis-
cussing influence of norms on scope of IP rights); Sean B. Seymore, Rethinking Novelty in Patent
Law, 60 DUKE L.J. 919, 929 (2011) (referencing a “disconnect between patent law and the norms
of science”); John Tehranian, Infringement Nation: Copyright Reform and the Law/Norm Gap,
2007 UTAH L. REV. 537, 543–50 (discussing disparity between copyright law and norms of in-
fringement). See generally Christopher Jensen, Note, The More Things Change, The More They
Stay the Same: Copyright, Digital Technology, and Social Norms, 56 STAN. L. REV. 531 (2003)
(discussing attempts to create a link between digital copyright law and social norms surrounding
tangible property rights).
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behavior and, particularly, in reinforcing formal law.3  Yet few have
recognized what major roles shame and shaming play in the way peo-
ple choose to follow or disregard intellectual property law.
In the shadow of formal law, shame and shaming govern intellectual
property’s liminal spaces, where protection is uncertain or inconsistent
with the strictures of formal law.  Much intellectual creation occurs in
markets, where selfish needs and wants must control.  There is no
Utopian commons where the fruits of creation and innovation are
shared by all; pride and practicality demand some measure of owner-
ship or control, tempting creators and copiers to claim more than they
have made.  Shame and shaming temper these impulses.  They reflect
the needs and wants of individual creative communities and, based on
those needs, either restrict copying or promote it.  Where formal law
does not reach, shame and shaming create and facilitate copying
norms, imposing order and predictability.  Where the law does reach,
shame and shaming provide a release valve: the discourse of shame
surrounding over-assertions of rights encourages rights holders to for-
bear from asserting weak or overreaching claims rather than being
publicly identified as “bullies” or “trolls.”  Thus, together, shame and
shaming help to create and maintain “low-IP equilibria,”4 where copy-
ing norms are created and internalized by the creative community and
optimized to its needs, rather than being imposed, top-down, by Con-
gress and courts.
The result is an overlay of shame- and shaming-driven behavior that
sits atop, and informally adjusts the boundaries of, formal intellectual
property protection.  This dynamic establishes and enforces intellec-
tual property “negative spaces”—areas where innovation and creation
thrive without significant formal intellectual property protection or
enforcement.5  A number of scholars have explored intellectual prop-
3. See generally, e.g., Dan M. Kahan, Reciprocity, Collective Action, and Community Policing,
90 CALIF. L. REV. 1513, 1536 (2002) [hereinafter Kahan, Reciprocity]; Dan M. Kahan, What do
Alternative Sanctions Mean?, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 591 (1996) [hereinafter Kahan, Alternative
Sanctions]; Toni M. Massaro, Shame, Culture, and American Criminal Law, 89 MICH. L. REV.
1880 (1991); Eric A. Posner, Law and Social Norms: The Case of Tax Compliance, 86 VA. L.
REV. 1781 (2000); Richard A. Posner & Eric B. Rasmusen, Creating and Enforcing Norms, with
Special Reference to Sanctions, 19 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 369 (1999); Raffaele Rodogno, Shame,
Guilt, and Punishment, 28 LAW & PHIL. 429 (2009); James Q. Whitman, What Is Wrong with
Inflicting Shame Sanctions?, 107 YALE L.J. 1055 (1998); Note, Shame, Stigma, and Crime: Evalu-
ating the Efficacy of Shaming Sanctions in Criminal Law, 116 HARV. L. REV. 2186 (2003).
4. See Kal Raustiala & Christopher Sprigman, The Piracy Paradox: Innovation and Intellec-
tual Property in Fashion Design, 92 VA. L. REV. 1687, 1698–99 (2006) (coining the term “low-IP
equilibrium”).
5. See id. at 1764 (coining and defining the term “negative space”).
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erty’s negative spaces.6  Most have conducted case studies, examining
such diverse areas as fashion,7 cuisine,8 magic tricks,9 stand-up com-
edy,10 typefaces,11 free and open-source software,12 sports,13 wikis,14
6. For a general discussion of negative spaces, see KAL RAUSTIALA & CHRISTOPHER
SPRIGMAN, THE KNOCKOFF ECONOMY (2012).
7. See generally Raustiala & Sprigman, supra note 4 (focusing on the lack of intellectual prop-
erty protection for fashion designs); Kal Raustiala & Christopher Sprigman, The Piracy Paradox
Revisited, 61 STAN. L. REV. 1201 (2009) (clarifying and expanding on the arguments explored in
Piracy Paradox and responding to scholarly proposals for legislative reform).
8. See generally Christopher J. Buccafusco, On the Legal Consequences of Sauces: Should
Thomas Keller’s Recipes Be Per Se Copyrightable?, 24 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 1121 (2007)
(exploring the copyrightability of recipes and concluding that economic, public policy, and cul-
tural considerations counsel against extending copyright protection to recipes); Emmanuelle
Fauchart & Eric von Hippel, Norms-Based Intellectual Property Systems: The Case of French
Chefs, 19 ORG. SCI. 187, 187–88 (2008) (arguing that recipes are better protected by self-en-
forced social norms than by intellectual property law); Jessica Litman, The Exclusive Right to
Read, 13 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 29, 44–45 (1994) (reexamining the bargain between copy-
right holders and the public that copyright entails and arguing that nascent industry can be stim-
ulated by lack of copyright protection); Raustiala & Sprigman, Piracy Paradox, supra note 4, at
1768; J. Austin Broussard, Note, An Intellectual Property Food Fight: Why Copyright Law
Should Embrace Culinary Innovation, 10 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 691 (2008) (arguing for
copyright protection for chefs’ innovative recipes as original works of authorship).
9. See generally Jacob Loshin, Secrets Revealed: Protecting Magicians’ Intellectual Property
Without Law, in LAW AND MAGIC: A COLLECTION OF ESSAYS 123 (Christine A. Corcos ed.,
2010) (describing the ways in which the magic community has developed social norms that pro-
tect intellectual property in the absence of IP law).
10. See generally Dotan Oliar & Christopher Sprigman, There’s No Free Laugh (Anymore):
The Emergence of Intellectual Property Norms and the Transformation of Stand-Up Comedy, 94
VA. L. REV. 1787 (2008) (arguing that intellectual property law is not a cost-effective way to
protect creativity of stand-up comedians and that social norms provide a substitute for IP law).
11. See Blake Fry, Why Typefaces Proliferate Without Copyright Protection, 8 J. TELECOMM.
& HIGH TECH. L. 425, 432–37 (2010) (arguing for the continued exclusion of typefaces from
copyright protection and explaining why that exclusion does not prevent innovation).  See gener-
ally Jacqueline D. Lipton, To © or Not to ©? Copyright and Innovation in the Digital Typeface
Industry, 43 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 143 (2009) (calling for Congress, the Copyright Office, and
courts to reexamine the issue of typeface copyrightability and arguing for, at most, thin protec-
tion for digital typefaces).
12. See generally, e.g., Yochai Benkler, Coase’s Penguin, or, Linux and The Nature of the
Firm, 112 YALE L.J. 369 (2002) (analyzing the economic and cultural implications of peer pro-
duction of information).
13. See, e.g., F. Scott Kieff et al., It’s Your Turn, but It’s My Move: Intellectual Property Pro-
tection for Sports “Moves,” 25 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 765, 766, 774–76
(2009) (arguing that the use of IP rights in sports gives more bargaining power to a much
broader range of athletes); Gerard N. Magliocca, Patenting the Curve Ball: Business Methods and
Industry Norms, 2009 BYU L. REV. 875, 877 (2009) (arguing that “there should be a presump-
tion against considering a process patentable subject matter under 35 U.S.C. § 101 when a norm
can be found in the relevant industry against patenting the class of innovations at issue”).
14. See generally Jon M. Garon, Wiki Authorship, Social Media, and the Curatorial Audience,
1 HARV. J. SPORTS & ENT. L. 95 (2010) (arguing for a wiki model in which collaboration is
encouraged but normative expectations of authorship are maintained).
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academic science,15 jambands,16 hip-hop music,17 tattoo artists,18 and
even roller derby pseudonyms.19  Negative spaces like these are cru-
cial pieces of the intellectual property law puzzle.  They prove that
people create even when they are not guaranteed exclusive control
over their creations.  For that reason, negative spaces tend to under-
mine the conventional wisdom that intellectual property law is neces-
sary to promote creation and innovation.  But while scholars have
paid increasing attention to these areas, none have articulated the im-
portance of shame and shaming in creating and maintaining them.
I submit that shame and shaming are not only major factors in gen-
erating negative spaces, but also may help guide our understanding of
intellectual property law more generally.  Shame and shaming regu-
late behavior in many settings, but they cannot substitute for formal
law.  They are too variable, and in some cases are harmful.  But shame
and shaming are valuable nonetheless: first, they modulate the law,
making it stronger or weaker depending on community needs; second,
they highlight where the law may draw lines in the wrong places.  The
role of shame and shaming in creating and governing negative spaces
implies that people gravitate toward “set points” of intellectual prop-
erty protection.  They create intellectual property rules where none
exist, and they rail against the rules when they are too restrictive.  Ex-
amining shame and shaming in the intellectual property context indi-
cates what people value in various creative settings and teaches that
15. See Keith Aoki, Authors, Inventors and Trademark Owners: Private Intellectual Property
and the Public Domain (pt. 2) 18 COLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARTS 191, 207 (1994) (explaining that
academic scientists are driven by “desires to obtain priority and to gain professional recognition,
promotions, grants, tenure and increased funding” to publish their research regardless of intel-
lectual property incentives). See generally Katherine J. Strandburg, Curiosity-Driven Research
and University Technology Transfer, in UNIVERSITY ENTREPRENEURSHIP AND TECHNOLOGY
TRANSFER: PROCESS, DESIGN, AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 93 (Gary D. Libecap ed., 2005).
16. See Mark F. Schultz, Fear and Norms and Rock & Roll: What Jambands Can Teach Us
About Persuading People to Obey Copyright Law, 21 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 651, 653, 676–77
(2006) (describing the ways in which the jamband community uses social norms to enforce copy-
right law).
17. See generally Horace E. Anderson, Jr., “Criminal Minded?”: Mixtape DJs, the Piracy Para-
dox, and Lessons for the Recording Industry, 76 TENN. L. REV. 111 (2008) (extending Raustiala
and Sprigman’s “piracy paradox” from the fashion industry to mixtapes and arguing for a model
that employs strategic forbearance of copyright enforcement); Horace E. Anderson, Jr., No Bi-
tin’ Allowed: A Hip-Hop Copying Paradigm for All of Us, 20 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 115 (2011)
(describing copying norms in hip-hop music).
18. See generally Aaron Perzanowski, Tattoos & IP Norms, 98 MINN. L. REV. (forthcoming
2013); Matthew Beasley, Note, Who Owns Your Skin: Intellectual Property Law and Norms
Among Tattoo Artists, 85 S. CAL. L. REV. 1137 (2012).
19. See generally David Fagundes, Talk Derby to Me: Intellectual Property Norms Governing
Roller Derby Pseudonyms, 90 TEX. L. REV. 1093 (2012) (investigating the extralegal governance
scheme used to protect derby names to explain the emergence of subcultural IP norms).
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the level and details of communities’ set points may vary from com-
munity to community.
As we consider the proper boundaries of intellectual property pro-
tection, therefore, we should consider the roles of shame and shaming
in shaping creation, innovation, and copying.  This Article first ex-
plores the operation of shame and shaming.20  Next, it examines the
relationships between shame, shaming, and formal law, first generally
and then in the intellectual property context.21  This is followed by an
analysis of the benefits and drawbacks of shame and shaming as regu-
latory mechanisms.22  The Article concludes with a brief discussion of
the normative implications of shame and shaming for intellectual
property law.23  While shame and shaming do not—and should not—
replace formal law, they influence it and sometimes stand in its shoes.
When considering whether to implement new protections and whether
to carve out exceptions to current protections, lawmakers should take
into account how shame and shaming will interact with formal rules,
and they should consider whether formal enactments will add value
beyond shame-based enforcement.
II. SHAME AND SHAMING
While shame and shaming share common roots, they operate some-
what differently.  Shame is a painful emotion of self-judgment, gener-
ated by the person who experiences it.24  Shaming is an external, and
generally public, appeal to the shame of another.25  Thus, while both
rely on the concept of shame, the entity that feels shame or gets
shamed may experience them quite differently.  Nevertheless, both
have the potential to be powerful shapers of behavior.
A. Shame Defined
Shame is the natural response of psychologically healthy individuals
when they fail to conform to their own values or to the prevailing
values of their family or social community.  For example, people might
experience shame if they lie, which is contrary to the value “lying is
wrong.”  Both an excess of shame and the lack of it are associated
20. See infra Part II.
21. See infra Part III.A.
22. See infra Part III.B.
23. See infra Part IV.
24. See generally ANDREW P. MORRISON, SHAME:  THE UNDERSIDE OF NARCISSISM 5 (1989)
(taking a psychoanalytic approach); Rau´l Lo´pez-Pe´rez, Guilt and Shame: An Axiomatic Analysis,
69 THEORY & DECISION 569 (2010) (economic); Heidi L. Maibom, The Descent of Shame, 80
PHIL. & PHENOMENOLOGICAL RES. 566 (2010) (philosophical).
25. JOHN BRAITHWAITE, CRIME, SHAME AND REINTEGRATION 100 (1989).
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with psychological pathology—neuroticism and psychoticism, respec-
tively.26  But in limited amounts, shame is not only normal and
healthy, but also a necessary element of social cohesion.27  Shame pre-
vents chaos by motivating people to follow the norms of society and
civilization: they conform, at least in part, because they would be
ashamed not to.
Shame operates in the gap between ambition and achievement.
Psychologically, people are strongly motivated to align their “actual
self” with their “ideal self” and their “ought self.”28  People feel
shame when there is a negative gap between their aspiration level (“I
aspire to be a generous person . . .”) and their perceived self on that
trait (“. . . but I am selfish sometimes”).29
What is “shameful” varies widely from culture to culture, but the
phenomenon of shame is universal and has even been identified in
nonhuman animals.30  Recent studies have shown that shame may
have genetic roots, evolving naturally through individual selection.31
This makes sense.  In addition to enhancing social cohesion, shame
benefits those who experience it, as they are less likely to run afoul of
rules, and by extension, less likely to experience punishment.  Indeed,
statistical modeling shows that people who experience shame should
have longer life spans than those who do not.32
While shame is innate, what people are ashamed of is defined
largely through their interactions with others.  Social science research
has demonstrated that people consciously or subconsciously absorb
and internalize the social norms of community influences such as fam-
ily, religion, profession, neighborhood, and politics.33  Each commu-
26. See Thomas J. Darvill et al., Personality Correlates of Public and Private Self Conscious-
ness, 13 PERSONALITY & INDIVIDUAL DIFFERENCES 383 (1992) (experimentally correlating ex-
cessive shame with neuroticism and a lack of shame with psychoticism).
27. See Klaus Jaffe, Simulations Show that Shame Drives Social Cohesion, in ADVANCES IN
ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE – IBERAMIA-SBIA 2006 88, 90 (Jaime Simao Sichman et al. eds.,
2006) (using simulations to model the function of shame in society).
28. See Volkan Topalli, When Being Good is Bad: An Expansion of Neutralization Theory, 43
CRIMINOLOGY 797, 799 (2005) (discussing shame and norms in active hard-core criminal
communities).
29. See Lo´pez-Pe´rez, supra note 24, at 579.
30. See Maibom, supra note 24, at 577–78.
31. Herbert Gintis, The Hitchhiker’s Guide to Altruism: Gene-Culture Coevolution, and the
Internalization of Norms, 220 J. THEORETICAL BIOLOGY 407, 414–15 (2003) (positing and model-
ing genetic development of altruism as a shame-enforced internal norm); Klaus Jaffe, Evolution
of Shame as an Adaptation to Pro-Social Punishment and Its Contribution to Social Cohesiveness,
COMPLEXITY, Nov.–Dec. 2008, at 46 (basing findings on computer simulations of genetic devel-
opment through natural selection).
32. See Jaffe, supra note 27, at 93.
33. See NORBERT ELIAS, THE CIVILIZING PROCESS 492 (Edmund Jephcott trans., Blackwell
Publishers 1994) (1939); see also Lo´pez-Pe´rez, supra note 24, at 575 (describing internalization).
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nity has a set of beliefs that are generally accepted among community
members and are partly sustained by their approval.34  Some social
norms are widely held, such as manners and etiquette, honesty norms,
and the norm against cannibalism.  But many social norms vary from
community to community.35  When people are, or aspire to be, mem-
bers of a particular community, they see themselves as embodying the
ideals of that community.  Acting or desiring something inconsistent
with those ideals will automatically generate shame.36  Shame there-
fore acts as an enforcer of community norms and values.
Shame does not require an audience per se,37 but it does depend on
some conception, either real or imagined, of what others would think.
Experiencing shame demands either being observed by others—peers,
respected authorities, customers, social cohort, society at large—or
seeing oneself as one presumes others would.38  When people are
“ashamed of themselves,” therefore, it is because they have internal-
ized a value they ascribe to others and see in themselves a failure to
embody that value.  In the words of Jean-Paul Sartre: “Shame is by
nature recognition.  I recognize that I am as the Other sees me.”39
Shame is related to, but different from, guilt.  Although many use
the terms interchangeably in common parlance, they differ to social
scientists: guilt is based on individual transgressions, while shame is
based on a perceived failure or defect of the whole self.40  For in-
stance, the sentiment that “I did something wrong,” differs from the
feeling that “there’s something wrong with me.”  Guilt and shame de-
pend on each other to shape behavior through the “guilt–shame cy-
34. See Lo´pez-Pe´rez, supra note 24, at 572 (defining social norms).
35. See id. at 575; see also Topalli, supra note 28, at 801 (providing an example of a commu-
nity, street criminals, with idiosyncratic norms).
36.  ELIAS, supra note 33, at 492; see also MORRISON, supra note 24, at 32 (discussing relation-
ship between shame and the “ego ideal”); id. at 79 (discussing relationship between shame and
the threat of rejection or abandonment by a “significant object”); Lo´pez-Pe´rez, supra note 24, at
575–79 (describing shame’s operation in shaping behavior through aversion to norm-breaking).
37. Experimental evidence tends to show that behavior need not be observed to generate
shame.  For example, failure feedback has proven to generate shame even when given privately
by computer without a human experimenter present.  David E. Conroy & Aaron L. Pincus,
Interpersonal Impact Messages Associated with Different Forms of Achievement Motivation, 79 J.
PERSONALITY 675, 694 (2011) (citing Holly A. McGregor & Andrew J. Elliot, The Shame of
Failure: Examining the Link Between Fear of Failure and Shame, 31 PERSONALITY & SOC.
PSYCHOL. BULL. 218 (2005)).
38. Maibom, supra note 24, at 569.
39. JEAN-PAUL SARTRE, BEING AND NOTHINGNESS 222 (Hazel E. Barnes trans., Gramercy
Books 1994) (1956).
40. See MORRISON, supra note 24, at 5; see also Maibom, supra note 24, at 568; June P.
Tangney et al., Shame, Guilt, and Remorse: Implications for Offender Populations, 22 J. FOREN-
SIC PSYCHIATRY & PSYCHOL. 706, 707 (2011) (criminological); John Wilson, Shame, Guilt and
Moral Education, 30 J. MORAL EDUC. 71, 72 (2001) (moral and literary).
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cle.”41  People feel guilty when they transgress, and then they feel
shame for being the sort of person who would do something worthy of
guilt.42  (“There is something wrong with me because I want/embody/
am willing to do something inconsistent with society’s expectations/
norms/mores.”)  For this Article’s purposes, however, the difference
between guilt and shame is less important than the difference between
shame and shaming.
B. Shaming Defined
While shame is a reflexive, internal emotion, shaming is an external,
aggressive action—an appeal to the shame of another, generally
before a public audience.  Shaming may have many motivations, in-
cluding a desire to impose norms on another, to trigger someone else’s
shame, or to inflict reputation-based punishment.  Regardless of the
motivation, shaming appeals to community norms and attempts to im-
pose them on someone else.
Sociologically, shaming includes “all social processes of expressing
disapproval which have the intention or effect of invoking remorse in
the person being shamed or condemnation by others who become
aware of the shaming.”43  Shaming may take many forms: scolding,
rebuking, ridiculing, scorning, avoiding, and shunning are all varieties
of shaming sanction.44  Shaming is often, but not always, directed at
stigmatizing a transgressor.  As Dan Kahan has explained, public
shaming may take the form of stigmatizing publicity (e.g., publishing a
list of “johns” to stigmatize those who violate anti-prostitution
norms); literal stigmatization (e.g., compelling someone to wear a
badge identifying herself as a transgressor); self-debasement (e.g., re-
quiring someone to perform a publically debasing act, such as carrying
a sign stating that she stole from a particular retailer); or contrition
(e.g., requiring a public apology).45  Although shaming may be di-
rected privately at the transgressor, it is usually also directed at a
broader audience.
Thus, most shaming has two audiences.  First, it is directed at the
“shamed” entity, as it may cause the target to internalize the values of
the shamers or to experience feelings of shame.  Second, it is directed
41. MORRISON, supra note 24, at 11.
42. See id.
43. BRAITHWAITE, supra note 25, at 100.
44. Edna Ullmann-Margalit, The Case of the Camera in the Kitchen: Surveillance, Privacy,
Sanctions, and Governance, 2 REG. & GOVERNANCE 425, 435 (2008).
45. See Douglas Litowitz, The Trouble with ‘Scarlet Letter’ Punishments, 81 JUDICATURE 52,
54–55 (1997) (citing Kahan, Alternative Sanctions, supra note 3, at 631) (describing Kahan’s
taxonomy).
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to a community of listeners who share the shamers’ values and who
may judge the target according to those values.   For example, sham-
ing is a core element of picketing: striking workers’ signs say, “Shame
on [employer],” not only to hurt the employer’s feelings, so to speak,
but also to harm the employer’s reputation—and by extension, its bot-
tom line.
C. How Shame and Shaming Shape Behavior
Both shame and shaming are powerful behavior shapers.46  Some-
times they work in concert: members of a community adhere to norms
and ideals both because they want to avoid feeling shame and because
they want to avoid being shamed or expelled from the community.47
Although the two forces may complement each other, they operate
differently: shame operates through automatic self-restraint, whereas
shaming operates through conscious manipulation by others.48  As a
result of this difference, the behavioral effects of shaming are more
complex, and less reliable, than the behavioral effects of shame.
1. Shame
People fear shame because shame is painful.  Long ago, Emile
Durkheim, Talcott Parsons, and other social researchers posited that
people often comply with internalized norms in order to avoid exper-
iencing shame, and this conclusion has been reinforced by more recent
experimental evidence regarding brain activity.49  In fact, research in-
dicates that shame is more powerful than law in shaping behavior.  For
example, empirical studies have shown that shame is more effective
than rules at securing compliance with college anti-underage drinking
policies;50 that appeals to conscience are more successful than threats
46. See generally, e.g., Liang-Chih Chang, The Effects of Moral Emotions and Justifications on
Visitors’ Intention to Pick Flowers in a Forest Recreation Area in Taiwan, 18 J. SUSTAINABLE
TOURISM 137 (2010) (correlating moral emotions of guilt, embarrassment, and shame with their
propensity to violate flower-picking rules in a park); Topalli, supra note 28, at 801 (reporting that
hard-core criminals are less likely to engage in snitching and other behaviors of which they
would be ashamed).
47. See Charles R. Tittle et al., A Test of a Micro-Level Application of Shaming Theory, 50
SOC. PROBS. 592, 594 (2003).
48. See Steven Russell, Reintegrative Shaming and the ‘Frozen Antithesis’: Braithwaite and
Elias, 34 J. SOC. 303, 306–08 (1998) (comparing Braithwaite’s concept of shaming to Elias’ con-
cept of shame).
49. Lo´pez-Pe´rez, supra note 24, at 570.
50. See Margaret S. Kelley et al., Deterrence Theory and the Role of Shame in Projected Of-
fending of College Students Against a Ban on Alcohol, 39 J. DRUG EDUC. 419, 432 (2009).
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of punitive sanction in securing compliance with tax laws;51 and that
hard-core criminals will avoid informing on others, even when inform-
ing would have legally beneficial effects, because they are ashamed to
“snitch.”52  Thus, shame may drive someone to refrain from behavior
even when formal law permits it, or to engage in behavior even when
formal law prohibits it.53
Shame derives its power from community identity.  Commercial
chefs, for example, internalize the values “it’s bad to copy someone’s
recipe exactly” and “it’s important to give credit to chefs who develop
significant recipes.”54  Accordingly, chefs comply with the norms of
originality and attribution associated with those values.  Members of
the open-source movement internalize the ideal “software sharing is
good” and comply with the distribution and license-proliferation
norms associated with it.55  When people violate community norms,
they feel a threat to their very identities.56  This makes the fear of
shame so potent that people follow community norms even when the
norms may not be in their immediate interest.  For example, someone
who has internalized the value of sharing software code will do so
even in cases where sharing the software code might be financially
harmful, or where keeping it secret might be financially beneficial.57
Shame effectively shapes even unobserved and unobservable be-
havior, because violators of community norms fear losing identity or
self-respect.58  Thus, shame can enforce norms even when they are
51. See Linda Brennan & Wayne Binney, Fear, Guilt, and Shame Appeals in Social Marketing,
63 J. BUS. RES. 140, 142 (2010) (citing James W. Harvey & Kevin F. McCrohan, Is There a Better
Way of Improving Compliance with the Tax Laws? Insights from the Philanthropic Literature, 7
J. PUB. POL’Y & MARKETING 138, 140 (1988)).
52. See Topalli, supra note 28, at 801 (reporting that hard-core criminals are less likely to
engage in snitching and other behaviors of which they would be ashamed).
53. See Fagundes, supra note 19, at 1147–48 (discussing the thin line between law and norms
as sources of coercive behavior shaping).
54. See Fauchart & von Hippel, supra note 8, at 188; see also Buccafusco, supra note 8, at 1154.
55. See Lawrence Lessig, Open Code and Open Societies: Values of Internet Governance, 74
CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1405, 1417 (1999) (“This is the core of the Open Source Movement: that the
code of open source software remains free for others to take, and modify, and use: that it sits in
the public domain, which means that no one needs the permission of anyone else to take it, and
improve it.”).
56. See Wilson, supra note 40, at 79.
57. See Gintis, supra note 31, at 408; see also Lo´pez-Pe´rez, supra note 24, at 570 (positing that
shame drives compliance with norms that are inconsistent with selfishness).
58. See Posner & Rasmusen, supra note 3, at 371.  This is the prevailing, modern view.  Some
theorists still maintain that shame requires an audience to function. See, e.g., Eugene Kandel &
Edward P. Lazear, Peer Pressure and Partnerships, 100 J. POLIT. ECON. 801, 806 (1992) (arguing
that shame is generated by external pressure and thus shapes behavior only when behavior is
observable).
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sporadically or non-uniformly enforced, as long as community mem-
bers understand those norms to be community values or ideals.
2. Shaming
Shaming, unlike shame, does not rely exclusively on internalization,
but also operates through public perception.  Shaming can make a
broader audience—members of a community who share the values of
the shamer—dislike the shamed entity, and therefore can harm even
an entity that does not share the community’s values.  Shaming sanc-
tions, such as shunning, can harm an entity’s reputation, identity, or
even profitability.  Other shaming sanctions, such as rebuke and re-
crimination, can lead to humiliation—the “manifestation of shame
which is the product of action perpetrated against the self by someone
else.”59  This in turn results in an actual or presumed loss of reputa-
tion.  Since entities want to avoid the disapproval of others, they tend
to avoid behavior that would lead to public shaming.  Thus, public
shaming may shape behavior even when the shamed entity has not
internalized the value in question—but it is doubtless most effective
when the shamed entity also experiences internal shame as a result of
having internalized the value.60  In those settings, shaming has the po-
tential to be more powerful than physical or pecuniary punishment.
Growing up, many children are far more moved by hearing a parent
say, “I am ashamed of you,” than by other punishments, such as being
spanked or having their allowance reduced.  The same reasoning ex-
tends to the context of formal legal punishment.
Shaming can also work on firms—collective entities such as corpo-
rations, partnerships, and associations.  Because shame is a human
emotion, firms cannot “have shame” as natural people do.  Firms lack
the emotional mechanisms required to feel, process, or react to shame.
But this is not to say that shame has no influence on firm behavior.
Firms are comprised of people who (unless they are pathological) un-
doubtedly experience shame.  Individuals’ shame may particularly in-
fluence small or closely held corporations, and may influence larger
firms as well, because the shame of a firm’s leaders will at least par-
tially guide the firm’s behavior.  But the collective shame-driven be-
haviors of multiple individuals—who may not have internalized the
same, or even consistent, values—is less predictable than the individ-
ual shame-driven behavior of a single person.  In addition, the exis-
59. See MORRISON, supra note 24, at 15.
60. See Nathan Harris, Reintegrative Shaming, Shame, and Criminal Justice, 62 J. SOC. ISSUES
327 (2006) (discussing relationship between reintegrative shaming, stigmatization, and experi-
ence of shame–guilt).
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tence of a corporate structure, and the presence of other people as a
buffer, may make larger corporate entities systematically insusceptible
to shame, as they may permit individuals to avoid taking internal re-
sponsibility for any value-betraying desires.  Therefore, although indi-
viduals within a firm will experience their own shame, the firm as a
whole cannot be expected to “have shame” as the individuals do.
Although shame may not control corporate entities, public shaming
can.  It is often effective: we can all think of countless instances in
which corporations, universities, sports teams, and the like have been
effectively shamed into changing their policies.61  Research shows that
shaming works on corporations largely because they are concerned
with reputation.62  As social scientist Rau´l Lo´pez-Pe´rez queries,
“[W]hy should firms spend huge amounts of money in efforts to im-
prove society and safeguard the environment, guided by ideas of Cor-
porate Social Responsibility . . . , if [they thought] nobody cared about
that?”63  In the intellectual property context, Internet shaming has un-
questionably influenced the behavior of potential IP bullies.  Many
attorneys now advise against sending cease-and-desist letters to “gripe
site” operators64—even letters the senders might believe to be “rea-
sonable”—because of the risk that a site operator will post the letter
publicly, harming the sender’s reputation.65
The reasoning behind this response may be cynical rather than ethi-
cal: firms make business decisions based on what will help or harm
61. For just a few examples, see Microsoft’s reversal of its Xbox One policies, Andrew Gold-
farb, Microsoft: ‘Shame on Us’ for Xbox One Messaging: Xbox One Chief Product Officer Marc
Whitten Responds to Fans’ Concerns, IGN (July 12, 2013), http://www.ign.com/articles/2013/07/
12/microsoft-shame-on-us-for-xbox-one-messaging; Nike’s transformation of its manufacturing
conditions and transparency, Max Nisen, How Nike Solved Its Sweatshop Problem, BUSINESS
INSIDER (May 9, 2013, 10:00 PM), http://www.businessinsider.com/how-nike-solved-its-sweat-
shop-problem-2013-5; and Rutgers’ firing of abusive basketball coach Mike Rice, Mike Lupica,
Mike Rice Finally Fired for his Actions but Shame on Rutgers if All Involved in the Player Abuse
Scandal Don’t Also Get the Ax, N.Y. DAILY NEWS (Apr. 3, 2013, 9:30 AM), http://www.
nydailynews.com/sports/college/lupica-shame-rutgers-don-fire-involved-article-1.1306415.
62. See James Q. Whitman, What Is Wrong with Inflicting Shame Sanctions?, YALE L.J. 1055,
1066–67 (1998).
63. See Lo´pez-Pe´rez, supra note 24, at 570 (footnote omitted) (establishing via economic mod-
eling that shaming drives such corporate norms).
64. Gripe sites are websites dedicated to the public shaming of people or corporations.  For a
general collection of gripe sites, see WEBGRIPESITES.COM, http://www.webgripesites.com/ (last
visited Sept. 18, 2013).  There are countless examples of gripe sites posting cease-and-desist let-
ters they have received. See, e.g., JP Morgan Chase is Officially Pissed Off About This Site,
CHASE BANK SUCKS (Jan. 3, 2009), http://www.chase-sucks.com/11/jp-morgan-chase-is-officially-
pissed-off-about-this-site/.
65. See Rachael Braswell, Consumer Gripe Sites, Intellectual Property Law, and the Use of
Cease-and-Desist Letters to Chill Protected Speech on the Internet, 17 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP.
MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 1241, 1287–88 (2007).
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their bottom lines.  But even these decisions depend on firms’ pre-
sumptions about the shame-based values of consumers, as consumers
generally want to patronize businesses they approve of.  Consumers
feel shame when they support businesses that betray their values.  (“I
am ashamed to be the sort of person who supports a business that
pollutes the environment or engages in other practices I abhor.”)
Businesses want prospective consumers to see them as embodying the
consumers’ values and are therefore keenly aware of the reputational
impact of shaming.  While public shaming may not trigger the
“shame” of a business per se, it may compel a business to feign shame
for reputational and, by extension, commercial purposes.
One might assume that public shaming is a more powerful behavior
shaper than internal shame because public shaming works in two
ways—emotionally and reputationally—while internal shame works
only emotionally.  But the contrary is true: as a behavior shaper,
shaming is actually less predictably effective than shame.  The effects
of shame on individual emotion are automatic, but the effects of
shaming are not.  Shaming, unlike shame, depends on the beholder.
Shaming demands, at least in part, that the target have basic respect
for the shamer’s opinion, or the opinions of the shamer’s audience.
Shaming has little effect if the target perceives its actions to be justi-
fied or misunderstood: “If the violator shrugs off the criticisms as a
product of ignorance, malice, or envy, and in addition anticipates no
bad effects on him from the reception of the criticisms by other peo-
ple, the criticisms will fail as sanctions for the criticized act.”66  This
has particularly broad implications for firms, as they cannot experi-
ence the emotional aspect of shaming.  Shaming, therefore, has little
power over firms that do not depend on public opinion for profits or
market share.67  A firm that believes its reputation does not “matter”
may simply ignore any attempts at shaming.68  Indeed, even if reputa-
tion-based shaming does influence public opinion, firms may brush it
off if they don’t perceive the “public” as significant enough to affect
profits.  An oil company can tolerate being labeled a “polluter,” and a
66. Posner & Rasmusen, supra note 3, at 374; see also Litowitz, supra note 45, at 55; John
Rothchild, Protecting the Digital Consumer: The Limits of Cyberspace Utopianism, 74 IND. L.J.
893, 968 (1999) (noting that shaming is ineffective in policing, for example, “the behavior of junk
e-mailers, who do not shrink from antagonizing the vast majority of the recipients of their
marketing”).
67. See Amy Morganstern, Comment, In the Spotlight: Social Network Advertising and the
Right of Publicity, 12 INTELL. PROP. L. BULL. 181, 196–97 (2008) (noting mixed effectiveness of
collective shaming action in motivating corporate entities, particularly those with market-domi-
nant products such as Google and Facebook).
68. See Posner & Rasmusen, supra note 3, at 380.
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manufacturer an “exploiter of workers,” unless they believe that a
meaningful number of relevant purchasers care enough to buy exclu-
sively from “eco-friendly” and “worker-friendly” companies.69  In ad-
dition, different people may hold different, and sometimes
diametrically opposed, values regarding what is shameful.  While
some viewed the public announcement by restaurant chain Chick-Fil-
A that it supported anti-gay causes as shameful, others thought it wor-
thy of celebration.70  In the absence of an authoritative consensus re-
garding what constitutes good-type or bad-type behavior, shame and
shaming cannot provide consistent governance and will inevitably be
unsatisfying for some portion of the population.
Furthermore, reputation-based shaming is unlikely to matter unless
it reaches the ears and eyes of people who care.  For example, al-
though the website Chilling Effects Clearinghouse (Chilling Effects)
performs the valuable service of collecting overzealous cease-and-de-
sist letters and takedown notices,71 there is no way of knowing
whether Chilling Effects succeeds in reducing the aggressiveness of IP
bullies.  For every Internet shaming campaign that reaches its audi-
ence, there may be dozens of attempts at shaming that few people
ever become aware of.  And while Internet shaming may be growing
as a method of enforcing community values on perceived transgres-
sors,72 the capacity of listeners may not be growing commensurately.
Some percentage of shaming campaigns, therefore, will just be shout-
ing into the wind—and it is difficult, if not impossible, to predict which
ones.
In addition, shaming works best if the transgressive behavior is ei-
ther rare or rarely detected.  Studies have shown that once behavior is
common, it becomes accepted, and shaming is no longer effective as a
69. In its early stages, therefore, public shaming may be more of an attempt to create public
“buy-in” for a particular value than an attempt to shape firm behavior.  Once a particular market
community internalizes a value, firms seeking that community’s business will be forced to con-
form to that value—to market themselves as “eco-friendly” or “worker-friendly”—but may not
see any reason to do so earlier.  Similarly, early-stage shaming may be an attempt to invite (or
coerce) a firm into a particular community by trying to convince the firm that the community is
large or influential enough to merit conforming to the community’s values.
70. See Joe Satran, Chick-Fil-A Sales Soar in 2012 Despite Bad PR, HUFFINGTON POST (Jan.
31, 2013, 12:24 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/01/31/chick-fil-a-sales-2012_n_2590612.
html.
71. See CHILLING EFFECTS CLEARINGHOUSE, http://www.chillingeffects.org (last visited Sept.
18, 2013).
72. See generally Leah Chan Grinvald, Shaming Trademark Bullies, 2011 WIS. L. REV. 625; Ira
S. Nathenson, Civil Procedures for a World of Shared and User-Generated Content, 48 U. LOUIS-
VILLE L. REV. 911, 951 (2010) (“[P]ublic-interest groups and other advocates play a major role in
criticizing overreaching copyright enforcement at the systemic level.”).
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punishment or deterrent.73  Similarly, shaming may actually promote
bad behavior when the behavior is common, since it may highlight the
fact that “everyone is doing it.”74  In the intellectual property context,
this carries an ironic twist: the more that IP bullies are shamed, the
less their practices may be seen as shameworthy.
Empirical studies show that, even in individuals, shame is a more
powerful behavior shaper than shaming.  One study established that,
although both shame and shaming were more effective than rules in
securing students’ compliance with college underage drinking policies,
students’ internal shame was more influential than external shaming
penalties, such as “name and shame” lists or embarrassment.75  An-
other study found that appealing to taxpayers’ consciences was more
successful in securing their compliance with tax laws than threatening
them with punitive sanctions.  In addition, the study found that volun-
tary compliance is more likely when an action is deemed important in
the wider society or community.  Thus, people are motivated more by
community approval than by community scorn.76
These findings reflect that while the pain of shame is automatic, the
pain of shaming can be circumvented by rejecting the shamer’s values.
Shaming can even generate rage and rebellion.77  The stigmatizing ef-
fect of shaming can drive targets out of a community instead of pulling
them in, creating “outsiders” who feel they owe nothing to the com-
munity and feel no discomfort in transgressing.78
3. Disintegration vs. Reintegration
Social scientists have struggled to discern what causes shaming to
backfire into rage or rebellion.  The most prominent theory originates
with sociologist John Braithwaite, whose work focuses predominantly
on shaming and crime.  Braithwaite divides shaming practices into
“disintegrative” and “reintigrative” varieties.79  Disintegrative sham-
ing stigmatizes offenders by alienating them from a community.  Thus,
73. See Posner, supra note 3, at 1789–90 (discussing the creation and enforcement of norms in
the tax context and more generally).
74. See Litowitz, supra note 45, at 56.
75. Kelley et al., supra note 50, at 432–33.
76. Brennan & Binney, supra note 51, at 142 (citing James W. Harvey & Kevin F. McCrohan,
Is There a Better Way of Improving Compliance with the Tax Laws? Insights from the Philan-
thropic Literature, 7 J. PUB. POL’Y & MARKETING 131, 140 (1988)).
77. See Rodogno, supra note 3, at 434 (discussing relationship between humiliation and nega-
tive effects in connection with shaming penalties).
78. See Anne-Marie McAlinden, The Use of ‘Shame’ with Sexual Offenders, 45 BRIT. J. CRIMI-
NOLOGY 373, 379 (2005) (discussing the disintegrative effects of naming and shaming sex
offenders).
79. See BRAITHWAITE, supra note 25, at 55.
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disintegrative shaming may not prevent unwanted behavior—and in
fact, may promote it—because instead of creating an incentive to con-
form to norms, stigmatization creates outcasts who reject community
values and consequently repeat their behavior without fear of emo-
tional pain.
In contrast, reintegrative shaming incorporates some notion of for-
giveness or repentance and a renewed relationship with the offender.
Braithwaite argues that it is therefore much more effective at prevent-
ing crime (and by extension, other behaviors unacceptable to the pre-
vailing community).  In his words, “the key to crime control is cultural
commitments to shaming in ways that I call reintegrative.”80  Unlike
stigmatization,
[r]eintegrative shaming . . . is disapproval dispensed within an ongo-
ing relationship with the offender based on respect, shaming which
focuses on the evil of the deed rather than on the offender as an
irremediably evil person, where degradation ceremonies are fol-
lowed by ceremonies to decertify deviance, where forgiveness, apol-
ogy, and repentance are culturally important.81
Where disintegrative shaming tells the transgressor, “you are bad,”
reintegrative shaming tells the transgressor, “do better next time.”
Braithwaite’s theory is instinctively appealing, but incomplete.
Other studies show that the effectiveness of shaming depends on in-
terdependency between the shamer and the transgressor.82  These
findings are consistent with the limits of shaming discussed above: rep-
utation-based shaming works only if (1) it is actually likely to influ-
ence the target’s reputation and (2) the target cares.  In short, an
offender who feels no relationship with the shamer is not the fittest
candidate for reintegration.
III. SHAME, SHAMING, AND LAW
Shame, shaming, and law share a long common history as systems of
social control.  At a fundamental level, shame and formal law are in-
tertwined.  In most cases, formal law embodies the values of society,
and breaking the law is considered per se shameful.83  This shame
80. Id. at 1.
81. John Braithwaite, Shame and Modernity, 33 BRIT. J. CRIMINOLOGY 1, 1 (1993).
82. See Carter Hay, An Exploratory Test of Braithwaite’s Reintegrative Shaming Theory, 38 J.
RES. CRIME & DELINQ. 132, 147–48 (2001) (empirical test demonstrating that “the negative
effect of shaming was not dependent on the level of reintegration”).
83. See TOM R. TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW 62–63 (1990); see also Catherine A.
Sanderson & John M. Darley, “I Am Moral, but You Are Deterred”: Differential Attributions
About Why People Obey the Law, 32 J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 375, 375–78 (2002); Cass R.
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functions even when people may not agree with a particular law: even
someone who believes that drugs should be legalized may refrain from
taking drugs because it is illegal—and thus shameful—to take them.84
Shaming, too, has long been used as a tool of law enforcement.  His-
torians have tracked the existence of parallel and complimentary sys-
tems of law and shaming at least as far back as ancient Greece, and
anthropologists have found it to be a universal phenomenon.85  Sham-
ing penalties—ranging from public physical punishments such as
whippings and hangings to more psychologically driven shaming via
stocks or pillories—were common forms of formal law enforcement
imposed by religious and state authorities in colonial America.86
Shaming’s popularity as an official penal technique waned in the nine-
teenth century, likely due in part to the influence of the Quakers—
who advocated for rehabilitative and educative punishment—and
partly to social science work of the day, which favored swift, certain
punishment over more flamboyant options.87
Today, so-called scarlet letter punishments have returned to vogue
as alternatives to the cost and time of prison.  A Milwaukee judge
offered reduced jail time to a convicted drunk driver who agreed to
wear a sandwich board publicly admitting his crime.88  One Florida
judge commonly sentences thieves to carry a sign in front of the place
they stole from, stating, “I stole from this store,” in lieu of fines or jail
time.89  Public shaming via apology and advertisement are also on the
Sunstein, On the Expressive Function of Law, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 2021, 2025–28 (1996); Jensen,
supra note 2, at 562 (“However, legal rules can also induce compliance with the law indirectly by
changing the social meaning of unlawful conduct.  As Cass Sunstein has observed, defining cer-
tain conduct as ‘against the law’ can ‘inculcate both shame and pride’ in the minds of individuals
. . . .”).
84. See Robert J. MacCoun, Drugs and the Law: A Psychological Analysis of Drug Prohibi-
tion, 113 PSYCHOL. BULL. 497, 501 (1993) (“[T]he mere fact that an act is illicit might have an
influence on behavior that is independent of the actual magnitude of the threat of
punishment.”).
85. See Sara Forsdyke, Street Theatre and Popular Justice in Ancient Greece: Shaming, Stoning
and Starving Offenders Inside and Outside the Courts, 201 PAST & PRESENT 3, 4–6 (2008); see
also Toni M. Massaro, Shame, Culture, and American Criminal Law, 89 MICH. L. REV. 1880,
1904–15 (1991).
86. See Litowitz, supra note 45, at 53–54.
87. See id. at 54.
88. See id. at 52.
89. This American Life, 379: Return To The Scene of the Crime (Public Radio International
radio broadcast May 1, 2009), available at http://www.thisamericanlife.org/radio-archives/epi-
sode/379/return-to-the-scene-of-the-crime (the description of the episode reads: “There’s a town
in Florida where if you shoplift, and get caught, a judge will send you back to the scene of your
crime to stand in front of the store, with a large sign that reads ‘I stole from this store.’ Ira
[Glass] and producer Lisa Pollak talk to one such teenager who was caught stealing from a
convenience store, the supervisor overseeing her punishment, and the judge who sends her
there.”).
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rise as formal punishments for white-collar crime.  Informal extrajudi-
cial shaming, such as conducting a “perp walk” for white-collar
criminals, is similarly growing in popularity.90  Furthermore, several
states publish lists of tax offenders.91  In most contexts, shame and
shaming reinforce formal law.  There are a few outlying exceptions to
this: for example, in communities of hard-core criminals, shame rein-
forces anti-“snitching” norms that conflict with law enforcement.92
A. IP, Specifically
The outlying exception in the criminal context seems to be the norm
in the intellectual property context: While shame and shaming rein-
force formal intellectual property law in some ways, they may actually
do even more to work against it.  Shame and shaming create rules
where formal intellectual property law provides none; and where for-
mal law does provide rules, shame and shaming limit enforcement.
For many, intellectual property infringement is shameful, just as vi-
olating criminal law is.  By labeling certain conduct as “infringing,”
society identifies it as transgressive, and potential offenders refrain
from infringing because they fear the shame of transgressing.  Exter-
nal shaming reinforces this; it is likely that shaming has been an infor-
mal remedy for unauthorized copying for as long as there has been
unauthorized copying.93  Recently, the Recording Industry Associa-
tion of America (RIAA) employed several varieties of shaming to
stem the tide of infringing music piracy.  First, the RIAA’s highly pub-
licized suits against file sharers made examples of a few file sharers—a
modern-day pillory—and reinforced the concept that infringement is
shameful.94  Second, the RIAA’s advertising campaign explicitly la-
beled peer-to-peer file sharing “theft,” which likened file sharing to an
established shameful behavior and may have triggered the shame
mechanism in many who had not previously viewed file sharing as
90. See John M. Ivancevich et al., Formally Shaming White-Collar Criminals, 51 BUS. HORI-
ZONS 401, 403–405 (2008).
91. Id. at 404.
92. See Topalli, supra note 28, at 801 (reporting that hard-core criminals are less likely to
engage in snitching and other behaviors of which they would be ashamed).
93. See, e.g., H. Toma´s Go´mez-Arostegui, The Untold Story of the First Copyright Suit Under
the Statute of Anne in 1710, 25 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1247, 1302–06 (2010) (describing how
parties to the first copyright suit in 1710 had previously used public shaming via printed handbills
as a remedy for copying when formal protection was not available).
94. See Julie E. Cohen, Pervasively Distributed Copyright Enforcement, 95 GEO. L.J. 1, 9
(2006).
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shameful.95  This example demonstrates how external shaming can de-
fine what is shameful.  Although a great deal of music file sharing
takes place today, some reports say that it has declined somewhat,96
and many people doubtless elect to not engage in file sharing because
they have internalized anti-file sharing values.  People, whether they
share files or not, are now more likely to believe that file sharing is
“wrong.”97
File sharing is only one example of this phenomenon.  Because
small-scale copyright and patent infringements are difficult to detect,
most potential infringers would probably never be caught.  But they
are guided by conscience; they refrain from infringing not because
they fear enforcement, but because they believe infringement is
shameful.  In that way, shame and shaming operate in the intellectual
property law context exactly as they do in other contexts.98  But
shame and shaming also do something else in the IP context: they sup-
plant and re-form formal law, creating restrictions and freedoms that
formal law does not.  Shame and shaming are major factors in creating
intellectual property’s negative spaces—areas of creation and innova-
tion that thrive without significant formal intellectual property protec-
tion.  These areas are important because they tend to defy the
conventional wisdom that intellectual property exclusivity is univer-
sally necessary as an incentive for creation and innovation.  Under-
standing what makes these areas function, therefore, helps us
understand when formal protection is, and is not, needed.
95. See id. at 18 (“Entertainment industry representatives have deployed a variety of rhetori-
cal tropes designed to position online copyright infringement, and particularly p2p filesharing, as
morally objectionable and socially insidious.”).
96. See, e.g., Press Release, NPD Grp., The NPD Group: Music File Sharing Declined Signifi-
cantly in 2012 (Feb. 26, 2012), available at https://www.npd.com/wps/portal/npd/us/news/press-
releases/the-npd-group-music-file-sharing-declined-significantly-in-2012/ (reporting a 17% de-
cline in the number of consumers using peer-to-peer file sharing services between 2011 and
2012).
97. According to a 2003 Gallup poll, 15% of teens aged 13–17 believed it was “morally
wrong” to download music from the Internet for free.  Steve Hanway & Linda Lyons, Teens OK
with Letting Music Downloads Play, GALLUP.COM (Sept. 30, 2003), http://www.gallup.com/poll/
9373/teens-letting-music-downloads-play.aspx.  Six years later (when the individuals who took
the Gallup survey were all over age 18), a CBS poll found that 30% of young adults aged 18–29
believed that online music sharing was “never acceptable.” Bootie Cosgrove-Mather, Poll:
Young Say File Sharing OK, CBSNEWS (Feb. 11, 2009, 8:29 PM), http://www.cbsnews.com/2100-
500160_162-573990.html. See also Herkko Hietanen et al., Criminal Friends of Entertainment:
Analysing Results from Recent Peer-to-Peer Surveys, 5 SCRIPTED 31, 39 (2008) (“Nearly half of
the users [of illegal file sharing sites] saw the use of illegal file sharing sites as morally questiona-
ble.  Evidently the file sharers are not breaking the law because they are unaware of it.” (foot-
note omitted)).
98. See, e.g., TYLER, supra note 83; Kahan, Alternative Sanctions, supra note 3, at 603.
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Shame and shaming create and govern these spaces in two ways.
First, in some creative communities, shame and shaming govern copy-
ing behavior when there is no formal law in place.  Second, shame and
shaming help discourage intellectual property owners from enforcing
their intellectual property rights in overreaching ways.  Shame and
shaming are therefore among the factors that help to sustain low-IP
equilibria.
1. Fear: Shame and “IP Without IP”
When people have internalized values regarding copying, they are
ashamed to violate them, regardless of what the law dictates.  This is
just as true in areas where formal intellectual property law does not
reach—areas that I call “doctrinal no man’s land”99—as it is in areas
well controlled by formal intellectual property law.  The result is that,
in doctrinal no man’s land, individuals conform to community norms
regarding copying without the strictures of formal law, creating “IP
without IP.”100
Even when formal law might permit copying in various contexts,
shame prevents it, or shapes the behavior of would-be copiers.  For
example, copyright fair use rules allow scholars to rely on quotations
from other scholars’ work,101 and law does not require attribution to
the original work.  Yet scholars still cite each other when they use
quotations.  Scholars even cite each other when there is no meaningful
risk that their plagiarism would be discovered, as when relying on ob-
scure sources or student research.  Why cite?  Taking credit for an-
other’s ideas might, especially in a world without anti-plagiarism
norms, be beneficial to the plagiarist.  But we live in a world that val-
ues citation, and scholars have internalized that norm.  Scholars would
be ashamed to take credit for others’ work (and rightly so).  Perhaps
scholars share other concerns as well: a desire for reciprocal citation,
for example, or a desire to appear well-read.  But a great many, no
doubt, cite because they believe it would be wrong not to.
Empirical case studies indicate that scholars are not alone in adher-
ing to copying and attribution norms because they would be ashamed
not to.  Haute cuisine chefs maintain an unspoken, yet well-defined,
99. See Elizabeth L. Rosenblatt, A Theory of IP’s Negative Space, 34 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS
317, 325 (2011) (defining “doctrinal no man’s land” as one type of negative space).
100. See Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, Does IP Need IP? Accommodating Intellectual Produc-
tion Outside the Intellectual Property Paradigm, 31 CARDOZO L. REV. 1437, 1439 (2010) (defin-
ing IP without IP as “Intellectual Production without Intellectual Property”).
101. See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2006) (including “scholarship, or research” among the categories of
fair uses of copyrighted material).
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set of sharing, anti-copying, and attribution norms that differ signifi-
cantly from the strictures of formal law.102  Roller derby participants
register their pseudonyms in a sport-wide database and consult that
database before choosing pseudonyms.  Although the law is silent on
the question of roller derby pseudonym copying, the participants
know that copying would betray community values, and being part of
the community is “central to the derby experience.”103  Tattoo artists
will copy trademarks and copyrighted works onto clients’ skin, but re-
frain from copying custom tattoos; they enforce these norms through
notions of self-respect, shame, and shaming rather than formal legal
remedies.104  Comedians refrain from copying not only expression (as
copyright law would demand), but also ideas, because they believe
joke-stealing is wrong.105  Typeface designers avoid copying designs
verbatim because to do so would be “dirty pool.”106  Free-software
advocates “see avoiding proprietary or commercial entanglements as
a moral imperative.”107
Although the interviewees in these case studies seldom use the
word “shame,” they consistently refer to notions of conscience and
community values in identifying the taboos and obligations of their
particular negative spaces.  This amounts to shame: the fear that if
they do not conform, they would be failing to live up to the values of
their community.  This is distinct from concerns about shaming, humil-
iation, or the embarrassment of being exposed, although certainly
each of those may play a part in the decision to comply with commu-
nity norms.108  Rather, it is about internalizing values, desiring to live
up to them, and fearing the emotional pain of shame that would result
from betraying those values.
Thus, the individual, internal shame of participants helps to sustain
the delicate equilibrium of low-IP negative spaces, where creation
102. See Buccafusco, supra note 8 at 1151–55; see also Fauchart & von Hippel, supra note 8, at
191–94.
103. Fagundes, supra note 19, at 1126–28.
104. See Beasley, supra note 18, at 1162–68 (reporting tattoo artists’ prevailing view that
“copycats are not true artists” and describing ways in which shame and shaming govern tattoo
artists’ conduct).
105. As one experienced stand-up comedian explained to me,  “It’s not just fear of being
exposed as a joke-stealer and what other people think.  It’s partly that, but it’s also about why
you’re doing stand-up in the first place.  Stand-up is all about being original.  If you’re not being
original, you’re nothing.”  Interview with John Rogers, in L.A., Cal. (February 10, 2013).
106. Lipton, supra note 11, at 169 (quoting LESLIE CABARGA, LOGO, FONT, AND LETTERING
BIBLE 12 (2004)).
107. Timothy K. Armstrong, Shrinking the Commons: Termination of Copyright Licenses and
Transfers for the Benefit of the Public, 47 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 359, 369 n.47 (2010).
108. Interview with John Rogers, supra note 105.
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thrives without significant formal intellectual property protection.  In
these communities, the law permits copying—even unlimited or un-
restricted copying.  One might expect that freedom to copy would un-
dermine the incentive to create in those areas.  It does not, likely
because creators in those areas are motivated by reasons other than
exclusivity or direct pecuniary benefit.  For example, creators may cre-
ate out of a desire for recognition or a desire to be part of a creative
community.  For creators who desire recognition, a community that
permits widespread copying but demands attribution is ideal.109  Cre-
ators who merely desire community membership do best to find a cre-
ative community and adhere to its norms, whatever they may be.  In
either case, the creator will be highly motivated to conform to com-
munity norms, and will feel shame for violating them, because those
very norms are among the creator’s reasons for joining the commu-
nity.  And even if a creator does not possess the community’s values at
the outset, the creator will eventually internalize them and feel shame
for violating them.
Like the norm against snitching in criminal circles, here shame
arises from doing something that is perfectly legal.  The shameful be-
havior may even be salutary from a broader societal perspective, but it
violates community norms.  Perhaps society would benefit from more
imitations of haute cuisine recipes.  But because the behavior is taboo
among a relevant segment of society—other chefs and “foodies”—
chefs generally refrain from copying.110  Shame may be an ideal en-
forcement mechanism when formal law will not work.  For example,
performance magicians have great difficulty relying on formal law to
protect their tricks, because seeking or enforcing protection would
usually require disclosing one’s secrets.  Instead, magicians abide by a
culture of secrecy, policed by shame.111  Where formal law leaves off,
shame takes over.
Because they are backed by the power of shame, these norms-based
systems are more sustainable than they might appear.  One might ex-
pect a handful of self-interested rogues to stray from a norms-based
system, thereby causing it to collapse.  According to Rochelle Cooper
Dreyfuss, a number of factors may contribute to the breakdown of
negative spaces, which highlights the fragility of low-IP equilibria.112
109. See Rosenblatt, supra note 99, at 343–45.
110. See Fauchart & von Hippel, supra note 8, at 187–88 (discussing community reactions to
recipe copying); cf. Topalli, supra note 28, at 810 (discussing participants’ guilt and shame for
violating the norm against snitching in active hard-core criminal communities).
111. See Jacob Loshin, supra note 9, at 134–35.
112. See Rochelle Dreyfuss, Fragile Equilibria, VA. L. REV. IN BRIEF (Jan. 22, 2007), http://
www.virginialawreview.org/inbrief.php?s=inbrief&p=2007/01/22/dreyfuss (describing “bounded
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Yet the norms persist.  While shame-based norms depend on a stable
conception of what constitutes good-type behavior,113 they will not
change easily.  Change requires a transformation in attitudes rather
than a handful of selfish defectors.
Many negative-space communities of individuals, as distinct from
those inhabited mostly by firms, exhibit signs of the “interdepen-
dence” that makes shame and shaming most effective.114  Although a
tattoo artist could work in a vacuum, most rely on each other for busi-
ness and professional growth.115  Open-source creators depend on
each other for crowdsourcing and technical support.116  Stand-up co-
medians depend on each other for bookings and moral support in
what could otherwise be a crushingly lonely existence.117
These are communities in which public shaming would be effective,
and occasionally it occurs: dozens of YouTube videos expose alleged
joke-stealers.118  Tattoo “plagiarist hall of shame” galleries show ex-
amples of norm violators.119  Academic science plagiarists may be
“named and shamed” in journals.120  Foodies draw attention to menus
that seem “plagiarized.”121  But for the most part, low-IP subcultures
seem not to depend on shaming.  Even people who believe they can
“get away with it” will adhere to community values because, as a mat-
ter of conscience, they want to see themselves as someone who be-
altruism, tipping, herding, failed leadership, and technological change” as likely factors contrib-
uting to the breakdown of negative spaces).
113. See Posner, supra note 3, at 1789–90 (discussing signaling-type norms).
114. See BRAITHWAITE, supra note 25, at 85–87 (recognizing that shaming is more effective in
“communitarian” societies, defined as societies whose members are interdependent).
115. Perzanowski, supra note 18 (manuscript at 36) (“[G]ossip can have serious social and
professional consequences.”).
116. See Gregg P. Macey, Cooperative Institutions in Cultural Commons, 95 CORNELL L. REV.
757, 776–77 (2010).
117. Interview with John Rogers, supra note 105.
118. See, e.g., Joe Rogan, Joe Rogan VS Carlos Mencia, ONSTAGE VIDEO, YOUTUBE (Jan.
23, 2013), http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=gdugSUFbzws; see also Oliar & Sprigman, supra
note 10, at 1821, 1825 (describing Internet popularity of clip showing feud between Joe Rogan
and Carlos Mencia and a “recent spate of comic shaming videos on YouTube”).
119. See, e.g., Guen Douglas, How to Avoid Tattoo Plagiarism, TAM BLOG (Mar. 15, 2012),
http://tattooartistmagazineblog.com/2012/03/15/guen-douglas-how-to-avoid-tattoo-plagiarism/;
Shannon Larratt, Tattoo Plagiarism, MODBLOG (Sept. 21, 2005), http://news.bme.com/2005/09/
21/tattoo-plagiarism/; NICKBAXTER.COM, http://www.nickbaxter.com/facemaster.cfm?Thread_
PageNum_search=6&PageNum_search=2&task=message_list&thread_index=105061& gener-
ate=1&topic_index=10 (last visited Sept. 9, 2013, 5:06 PM); NYArtman, Plagiarist Hall of Shame,
NYARTMAN.COM (Apr.27, 2011, 10:01 PM), http://www.nyartman.com/index.php?option=com_
content&view=article&id=292:plagiarist-hall-of-shame&catid=3:blog-rants&Itemid=65.
120. See ‘Index 2007: Names of Plagiarists’: Is Naming and Shaming the Answer?, BIOETHICS,
Nov. 2007, at ii.
121. See Buccafusco, supra note 8, at 1122 (describing one such event on the culinary blog
eGullet.org).
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longs.  This is consistent with case studies about negative spaces: some
are close-knit, like the communities of roller derby participants or
elite tattoo artists,122 but others are not.  Most lack barriers to en-
try.123  Yet even in the open-source community, where it would be
nearly impossible to know who is toeing the line and who is not, cer-
tain core values prevail: distributed software creation is good; sharing
is good; closed licensing is bad.124  These values spread, even though
the open-source community is geographically far-flung; the Internet
permits effective dissemination of common values, and shame
follows.125
These communities rely on a network of custom and internal en-
forcement to develop norms and teach new members what behaviors
are accepted and what behaviors are shameful.  This shame-teaching
takes place largely informally, through simple communications within
the community.  It may also involve requesting that community mem-
bers conform,126 shaming within the community, or denying members
future community benefits.  Chefs, for example, are less likely to share
recipes with those who betray community values.127  Tattoo artists will
personally confront or badmouth those who copy custom tattoos.128
Performance magicians will stop associating with colleagues who re-
veal how tricks are performed; when a rogue magic trick manufacturer
sold unauthorized illusions, a long list of respected magicians signed a
letter shaming the manufacturer.129  These informal enforcement
mechanisms teach community members what constitutes good-type
and bad-type behavior, so that they will be driven by conscience to
comply with norms regardless of whether they are likely to be caught.
In this way, negative-space communities conduct shame-teaching
through a combination of custom—communicating norms and values
122. Fagundes, supra note 19, at 1101; Beasley, supra note 18, at 1167.
123. See, e.g., Schultz, supra note 16, at 679 (noting that in the jamband community, “member-
ship is fluid, often anonymous, and requires no membership card”).
124. See Lessig, supra note 55, at 1417 (“This is the core of the Open Source Movement: that
the code of open source software remains free for others to take, and modify, and use: that it sits
in the public domain, which means that no one needs the permission of anyone else to take it,
and improve it.”).
125. See Braithwaite, supra note 81, at 13–15 (1993) (discussing urban varieties of community
in the context of reintegrative shaming).
126. For example, the University of Virginia’s Electronic Text Center, which houses many
public domain texts, is concerned principally with archival dependability when it begs users not
to copy its texts for commercial use or mount them on other servers.  Brad Bedingfield, Note,
Copyrighting Medieval Literature: Editing and Publishing the Pre-Modern Public Domain, 28
COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 213, 244–45 (2005).
127. Fauchart & von Hippel, supra note 8, at 193.
128. Beasley, supra note 18, at 1167.
129. Loshin, supra note 9, at 138.
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to each other—and enforcement techniques, such as shaming, denial
of reciprocal benefits, and even expulsion for those who fail to
comply.
Thus, each negative-space creative community makes its own copy-
ing and attribution norms, and the participants in the community are
compelled by shame, and to some extent, shaming, to comply with
them.  Because they arise organically from within the community,
these norms are customized to the needs of the greater community.130
They may not serve each participant ideally, but they are more likely
to suit participants’ needs than the one-size-fits-all approach of formal
law, which is not only imposed from the outside to suit the needs of
external constituencies like major entertainment companies, but is
also designed to work across all industries and creative endeavors.131
2. Loathing: Shaming and IP Forbearance
While internal shame prevents copying, external shaming encour-
ages it.  More accurately, external shaming discourages intellectual
property owners from aggressively enforcing their rights.  When copy-
right, patent, or trademark owners send cease-and-desist letters, the
Internet makes it easy to shame the intellectual property owners by
accusing them of bullying or being trolls.  In so doing, shamers create
a public conversation that transforms intellectual property owners
into “bad guys” simply for enforcing their own rights.  This discourse
uses the language of shaming to shape the reaction of the shamed en-
tity and to build public opinion.  The terms “troll” and “bully” signal
shameful identity just as the terms “junkie” and “slut” signal shaming-
based condemnation of drug use and female sexuality.132
The Internet creates a panopticon.133  The instant an intellectual
property owner sends a cease-and-desist letter, that letter can be
130. See Fagundes, supra note 19, at 1136–37 (discussing the flexibility of the derby name
regulation system).
131. See Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Policy Levers in Patent Law, 89 VA. L. REV. 1575,
1577 (2003) (arguing that a formal, unitary patent system is ill-equipped to manage the diverse
range of industries it must cover).
132. See Polly Radcliffe & Alex Stevens, Are Drug Treatment Services Only for ‘Thieving
Junkie Scumbags’? Drug Users and the Management of Stigmatised Identities, 67 SOC. SCI. &
MED. 1065, 1066 (2008) (discussing the shaming and stigmatizing effect of the “junkie” label);
Lori Rackl & Andrew Herrmann, Women Trekking Back to Their Dorm in the Morning After a
Hookup Take the ‘Walk of Shame.’ For Guys, It’s the ‘Stride of Pride.’ College Women Today. . .,
CHI SUN-TIMES, Mar. 21, 2005 (discussing gender-based double-standard and shame-based con-
demnation of female “sluts”).
133. See Jeremy Bentham, Proposal for a New and Less Expensive Mode of Employing and
Reforming Convicts, 6 BRITTANIC MAGAZINE 403, 406 (1798) (“[A] building circular . . . the
prisoners in their cells . . . .  By blinds and other contrivances, the Inspectors concealed . . . from
the observation of the prisoners: hence the sentiment of a sort of invisible omnipresence.  The
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posted to the Internet for the whole world to see.  And when a shamer
begins the discourse, the shamer controls it; when a shamer introduces
an IP owner to the world as a bully or troll, the world sees that intel-
lectual property owner through the shamer’s eyes.  This gives accused
infringers the power to turn the accusation around and impose sharing
norms on IP-holding entities that may be big and powerful.
Indeed, fear of external shaming may act prophylactically, prevent-
ing powerful intellectual property owners from overextending their
rights.134  One commentator advises that “[i]n a classic ‘David versus
Goliath’ battle, throngs of people come to the defense of the small
business owner” who is perceived to be at the mercy of the larger
corporate giant.135  Attorneys are increasingly aware that “enforce-
ment can bring unwanted negative publicity.”136  Sending a cease-and-
desist letter carries with it an enormous risk of negative attention.
The phenomenon is so well-known that it has a name: the Streisand
Effect.137  The name originated in 2003, when photographer Ken
Adelman and his wife sought to document California coastal erosion
by photographing the entire California coast from a helicopter and
posting their results on the website www.californiacoastline.org.
These photos included and identified an aerial view of Barbara
Streisand’s estate.138  Streisand demanded the photo be removed, first
via cease-and-desist letter139 and later via lawsuit, which the Los An-
geles Superior Court dismissed.140  The ironic result was that Streisand
not only failed to get the photos removed, but also drew massive at-
tention to the photo.  Reports state that the image was downloaded
just six times prior to the suit but was accessed as many as 420,000
whole circuit reviewable with little, or . . . without any, change of place.  One station in the
inspection part affording the most perfect view of every cell . . . .”).
134. See Ullmann-Margalit, supra note 44, at 432–33 (discussing the chilling effect of surveil-
lance on behavior).
135. John Sternal, How to Trademark Shame a Larger Company, SMALL BUS. TRENDS (Mar.
8, 2012), http://smallbiztrends.com/2012/03/how-to-trademark-shame-a-larger-company.html.
136. William T. Gallagher, Trademark and Copyright Enforcement in the Shadow of IP Law,
28 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 453, 494 (2012).
137. See What Is the Streisand Effect?, ECONOMIST (Apr. 15, 11:50 PM), http://www.economist.
com/blogs/economist-explains/2013/04/economist-explains-what-streisand-effect.
138. See Paul Rogers, Photo of Streisand Home Becomes an Internet Hit, SAN JOSE MERCURY
NEWS, June 24, 2003, at 1B, available at http://www.californiacoastline.org/news/sjmerc5.html.
139. Letter from John M. Gatti, Attorney, Alschuler Grossman Stein & Kahan LLC, to Ken-
neth Adelman (Feb. 10, 2003), available at http://www.californiacoastline.org/streisand/threat.
pdf.
140. Complaint at 21, Streisand v. Adelman, No. SC 077 257 (Cal. Super. Ct. Dec. 31, 2003),
available at http://www.californiacoastline.org/streisand/complaint.pdf; Statement of Decision at
45, Streisand v. Adelman, No. SC 077 257 (Cal. Super. Ct. Dec. 31, 2003), available at http://
www.californiacoastline.org/streisand/slapp-ruling.pdf.
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times in the month after Streisand’s suit was filed.141  By taking legal
action, Streisand created exactly the opposite of her desired result.
Her experience and scores of others have taught intellectual property
owners that it is risky to assert one’s rights, especially when the rights
are weak or the alleged infringer has many sympathizers.
Shaming influences not only whether, but also how, intellectual
property owners enforce their rights.  Savvy IP owners know that their
cease-and-desist letters may be posted on the Internet, so they incor-
porate more reasonable demands and make them less threatening in
tone.142  When asserting trademark rights, they shift responsibility
away from themselves, relying on the so-called duty to police to ap-
pear more practical and less overbearing.143  By seeming reasonable,
intellectual property owners can not only avoid being shamed, but can
develop positive reputations.  They can harness the shame of consum-
ers who would be ashamed to patronize companies who betray the
consumers’ values.  Jack Daniel’s garnered positive attention, for ex-
ample, by sending an exceedingly friendly cease-and-desist letter to an
author who parodied the Jack Daniel’s label on a book cover, with a
jovial tone and a more limited set of demands than an average letter
of its kind.144  Regardless of the motivation, these moves gradually
shift intellectual property owners’ behavior toward the shamers’ val-
ues and away from maximal enforcement.
In the Internet age, shaming campaigns have the potential to spread
virally.  Social media sites like Facebook help harness network effects
to spread shaming messages; the more “likes” a shaming campaign
garners, the larger an audience it reaches.145  In addition, sites like
Chilling Effects seek to harness this phenomenon by collecting and
indexing aggressive cease-and-desist letters.  Chilling Effects thereby
identifies IP bullies and labels them as such.146  Similarly, for years,
141. Ruling on Submitted Matters, Tentative Decision and Proposed Statement of Decision at
6, Streisand v. Adelman, No. SC 077 2577 (Cal. Super. Ct. Dec. 3, 2003), available at http://www.
californiacoastline.org/streisand/slapp-ruling-tentative.pdf; Rogers, supra note 138.
142. See Gallagher, supra note 136, at 495 (quoting an interviewed attorney’s statement: “You
always know that a letter you send can be on the Internet that same day, so you write it
accordingly.”).
143. See David E. Armendariz, Note, Picking on the Little Guy? Asserting Trademark Rights
Against Fans, Emulators, and Enthusiasts, 90 TEX. L. REV. 1259, 1267–68 (2012) (discussing in-
stances in which trademark holders have claimed that pursuit of enthusiasts was rooted in duty
to police rather than desire to pursue).
144. See Debra Cassens Weiss, Jack Daniel’s Cease-and-Desist Letter Goes Viral for Being
Exceedingly Polite, A.B.A. J. (July 26, 2012, 9:38 AM CDT), http://www.abajournal.com/news/
article/jack_daniels_cease-and-desist_letter_goes_viral_for_being_exceeedingly_poli/.
145. See Grinvald, supra note 72, at 627 (describing a Facebook shaming campaign conducted
by a small brewery against a large, multi-million dollar company).
146. See CHILLING EFFECTS CLEARINGHOUSE, supra note 71.
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the Patent TrollTracker blog named and shamed patent assertion
entities.147
These attempts not only shift public opinion about the shamed enti-
ties, but also create public opinion about what constitutes good-type
and bad-type behavior.  Until Patent TrollTracker embarked on its
campaign of naming and shaming patent assertion entities, few had
ever heard of a “patent troll,” and few had an opinion at all about the
moral propriety of being in the patent litigation business.  But by cre-
ating a discourse of shame around patent assertion behavior, Patent
TrollTracker (and many others who took part in the conversation)
made the patent assertion business model shameful—or at least ethi-
cally questionable.148  Large-scale campaigns have even influenced the
path of formal law.  In 2011 and 2012, shaming campaigns drew atten-
tion to proposed Internet IP regulations known as the Stop Online
Piracy Act (SOPA) and the PROTECT-IP Act (PIPA), mixing market
and electoral power with the language of shame and ultimately defeat-
ing the laws’ passage.149
Shaming sends the message that certain values are important
enough for the target to adopt (or at least perform) them.  If environ-
mentalists did not shame polluters, the polluters might not perceive a
sufficient reason to justify the expense of avoiding it.  Merely drawing
attention to polluting behavior would not produce the same result be-
cause attention alone, without normative content, does not create or
reinforce values.  Shaming not only draws attention to the behavior,
but also reinforces to all who listen—including the target and the pub-
lic at large—that the behavior in question is wrong.
By shaming a target, shamers invite the target to become a part of
the shamers’ community value system.  Shamers not only threaten the
147. The original Patent TrollTracker blog has since been discontinued.  However, earlier
posts from the blog have been archived and are available at Patent TrollTracker Resurrected,
TECH RIGHTS, http://techrights.org/patent-trolltracker/ (last visited Sept. 23, 2013).
148. See, e.g., Lisa A. Dolak & Blaine T. Bettinger, The United States Patent System in the
Media Mirror, 58 SYRACUSE L. REV. 459, 487–89 (2008) (identifying “patent trolls” as among the
most common media criticisms of the U.S. patent system).
149. See Cory Doctorow, SOPA/PIPA Mashup: How Much Hollywood Money Did Your
Lawmaker Take? Name and Shame with Fellow Voters, BOINGBOING (Jan. 21, 2012, 6:24 AM),
http://boingboing.net/2012/01/21/sopapipa-mashup-how-much-hol.html (shaming legislators who
supported the bills); see also Mark Gibbs, No Blackout for SOPA/PIPA? We Know Who You
Are, COMPUTERWORLD (Jan. 20, 2012, 10:27 AM), http://www.computerworld.com/s/article/
9223589/No_blackout_for_SOPA_PIPA_We_know_who_you_are.?pageNumber=1 (shaming
websites that did not participate in public demonstration against bills); Alex Wilhelm, For
Shame! Microsoft’s Continued Support of the PROTECT IP Act is Disgraceful, THE NEXT WEB,
(Dec. 26, 2011, 5:19 AM), http://thenextweb.com/microsoft/2011/12/26/for-shame-microsofts-
continued-support-of-the-protect-ip-act-is-disgraceful/ (shaming Microsoft, a corporate sup-
porter of the bills).
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target, but also reintegrate it (in the Braithwaitean sense) by giving
the target an opportunity to be forgiven—to “do better next time.”  If
the target adopts or performs the shamers’ values, it has the opportu-
nity to join the shamers’ community.  In addition, if the shamers and
the target are at all interdependent, a reformed target will gain cus-
tomers, or at least stop losing them.   Thus, reintegrative shaming is
possible even outside the context of insular communities.
Were it not for shaming, IP bullies might not appreciate the number
and potency of those who care about pro-sharing values or attribution.
A few recent incidents highlight this.  In June 2012, the United States
Olympic Committee (USOC) sent a cease-and-desist letter to the fi-
ber-arts community Ravelry, demanding that the community stop us-
ing the term “Ravelympics” for a community event.150  The USOC
was well within its rights to send the letter: in fact, the Olympic and
Amateur Sports Act (OASA), which grants it exclusive rights in the
term “Olympics,” is significantly stronger than the trademark rights
granted by the Lanham Act, as the OASA does not provide infringers
with the same expression-based exceptions.151  Ravelry changed the
name of its event to the Ravellenic Games,152 even though there was
little likelihood that Ravelry’s use of the suffix “-lympics” would cause
confusion or harm to the USOC’s mark.  But the fiber-arts community
members were not as ready to accept what it saw as bullying, and they
reacted virulently.  Over two days, the community generated over
2,300 furious message board posts, and the story went viral to news
outlets like Gawker, Slate, and NPR.153  As a result, the USOC
learned a lesson, or at least appeared to: it posted a formal letter of
150. See Adrian Chen, Knitters Outraged After U.S. Olympic Committee Squashes Knitting
Olympics—and Disses Knitters, GAWKER (June 20, 2012, 5:44 PM), http://gawker.com/5920036/
us-olympics-committee-is-mad-at-knitting-olympics-for-denigrating-real-athletes?tag=olympics
(reproducing letter).
151. See 36 U.S.C. § 220506 (2006).
152. See Mary Mooney, USOC Wins the Olympic Battle, but Ravelry Wins the War, THE ORE-
GONIAN (June 27, 2012, 2:37 PM), http://blog.oregonlive.com/knitting/2012/06/usoc_wins_the_
olympic_battle_b.html.
153. See For the Love of Ravelry (forum), RAVELRY, http://www.ravelry.com/discuss/for-the-
love-of-ravelry/2189293/1-25 (Ravelry account required) (including a moderator post observing
users’ anger: “If you cannot contribute in respectful manner then you need to find another place
to post. . . . [I]f you guys can’t reel it in, we’ll have to.  We will lock this thread permanently if it
comes to that.”); see also Chen, supra note 150; Will Oremus, Mob of Angry Knitters Takes the
Gold in Battle with U.S. Olympic Committee, SLATE (June 22, 2012, 3:52 PM), http://www.slate.
com/blogs/future_tense/2012/06/22/ravelry_olympics_usoc_apologizes_to_online_knitting_com-
munity_over_trademark_crackdown.html; Mark Memmott, After Knitters Get In A Twist, USOC
Apologizes for ‘Cease And Desist’ Letter, NPR (June 21, 2012, 1:55 PM), http://www.npr.org/
blogs/thetwo-way/2012/06/21/155508908/after-knitters-get-in-a-twist-usoc-apologizes-for-cease-
and-desist-letter.
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apology to the community stating, among other things, that it “em-
brace[s] hand-crafted American goods.”154
In January 2013, the Fox television show Glee broadcast a cover
version of the Sir Mix-A-Lot song “Baby Got Back” that was copied,
note-for-note, from a version by independent artist Jonathan Coulton.
This was par for the course: Glee had copied covers before, including
covers from artists DJ Earworm, Greg Lasswell, and Nouvelle
Vague.155  This did not constitute infringement because, as a function
of the compulsory licensing scheme for creating cover songs, cover
artists do not own rights in their cover versions.  If a cover version of a
song is close enough to the original that it fits within the compulsory
licensing scheme, the cover does not constitute infringement of the
original.  But by making something so similar to the original, the cover
artist essentially gives up the right to argue that he or she added any-
thing original to the song.156  As a practical matter, a listener might
find a cover version to be quite novel, but the law says differently.
Thus, Fox and Glee have the right to copy cover songs without permis-
sion from the cover maker, as long as they enter into the appropriate
licenses with the original song creator.  With Coulton, however, this
approach backfired: Coulton is a standard-bearer for the Creative
Commons community and its pro-sharing, pro-attribution values.
When Coulton made a blog post about Glee’s unauthorized use of his
cover, the Internet exploded with outrage at Glee’s choice not to attri-
bute the cover to Coulton.157  Although Glee was not required by law
to give credit to Coulton, the community shamed Glee and Fox, in
essence inviting them to join the community’s pro-attribution values.
It is still too soon to say whether the campaign has had any effect on
Fox’s attribution practices, but it has generated enough attention to
touch Fox’s bottom line: in a few days on iTunes, sales of Coulton’s
154. Statement from USOC Spokesperson Patrick Sandusky, TEAM USA (June 21, 2012, 12:07
PM), http://www.teamusa.org/News/2012/June/21/statement-from-usoc-spokesperson-patrick-
sandusky.aspx.
155. See Laura Hudson, Jonathan Coulton Explains How Glee Ripped Off His Cover Song—
and Why He’s Not Alone, WIRED (Jan. 25, 2013, 3:21 PM), http://www.wired.com/underwire/
2013/01/jonathan-coulton-glee-song/; see also Nicola Roberts, A Collection of Covers Glee Bor-
rowed from Other People, LIVEJOURNAL (Jan. 25, 2013, 6:23 AM), http://ontd-glee.livejournal.
com/2513279.html.
156. 17 U.S.C. § 115(a)(2) (“A compulsory license includes the privilege of making a musical
arrangement of the work to the extent necessary to conform it to the style or manner of interpre-
tation of the performance involved, but the arrangement shall not change the basic melody or
fundamental character of the work, and shall not be subject to protection as a derivative work
under this title, except with the express consent of the copyright owner.”).
157. See Michele Catalano, Jonathan Coulton vs. Glee and Fox Update: Last Laughs, FORBES
(Jan. 31, 2013, 8:17 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/michelecatalano/2013/01/31/jonathan-
coulton-vs-glee-and-fox-update-last-laughs/.
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“Baby Got Back – In the Style of Glee” (with all proceeds going to
charity) sold more units than any track actually produced by Glee.158
Although these stories demonstrate the communicative power of
shaming, they also demonstrate its unpredictability.  While each has
felt the effects of shaming, there is no guarantee that either the USOC
or the producers of Glee will change their enforcement or attribution
behaviors in the long term.  The shamers invited both entities to join
their norms-communities, but it remains to be seen whether either will
join.  We can be sure, however, that each shamed target has a new-
found awareness that competing norms exist—something they may
not have known before the shaming occurred.  Likewise, consumers
can rely on the shaming to make decisions about whether they want to
support the Olympics or watch Glee.  This demonstrates the discursive
aspect of shaming: it carries information about what the shamers be-
lieve is, and should be, shameful.
B. Strengths and Weaknesses of Shame and Shaming as
Regulatory Mechanisms
As regulatory mechanisms, shame and shaming have a number of
significant benefits, even as compared with formal law: they are more
democratizing, more flexible, and sometimes more effective at gov-
erning behavior.  But it would be a mistake to assume that these bene-
fits make shame and shaming optimal tools for regulating copying in
all circumstances.  In fact, both shame and shaming have significant
flaws and risks.  Shame only affects a small portion of the population,
and shaming, although it applies more universally, is far less likely to
be effective.  Both shame and shaming have the potential to be deeply
damaging.  For that reason, they are not adequate replacements for
formal law.  I suggest that in an ideal intellectual property system,
they would augment, not supplant law, serving more as tools for un-
derstanding proper levels of protection rather than as regulatory
mechanisms in and of themselves.
1. A Few Strengths
Many of the strengths of shame and shaming as regulatory mecha-
nisms are discussed above: shame, and to some extent shaming, com-
pels people to comply with laws and norms, even when their
transgressions would likely never be discovered.159   In the intellectual
property context, shame and shaming allow communities to customize
158. Id.
159. See supra Part II.C.1.
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copying and attribution norms to the needs and wants of particular
creative communities.160   Shame and shaming not only deter and pun-
ish, but they also may result in some measure of reconciliation and
proportionality, as the community itself metes out what it believes is
an appropriate punishment for transgression.161
Shame and shaming are also cost-effective.  Shame costs nothing,
since it happens automatically, and shaming, especially in the age of
viral Internet discussion, is very inexpensive.  Both can be effective
even against minor transgressions.  Considering the cost of litigation, a
lawsuit over an appropriated roller derby pseudonym, an imitated rec-
ipe, a stolen joke, or a plagiarized blog post would—even if the law
permitted them—surely not be worth the price.  In contrast, shame
and shaming are virtually free.
For that reason, shame and shaming can level the playing field be-
tween Davids and Goliaths.162  In many circumstances, intellectual
property owners hold all the cards, while accused infringers hold
none.  It costs very little to send a cease-and-desist letter or to initiate
a lawsuit, but resisting that letter or defending that suit can be crush-
ingly expensive and time consuming.163  The result is that IP owners
may be able to extract monetary settlements or other business conces-
sions without ever giving meaningful consideration to the merits of
their claims.  In the online context, this effect is particularly powerful.
Under the Digital Millennium Copyright Act, protections for alleged
infringers are weak, as internet service providers are required to re-
move accused material even before the alleged infringer has an oppor-
tunity to respond to the accusation.164  An alleged infringer may have
material reinstated by filing a counternotice, but judicial protection
for wrongly accused material is not available unless (1) the target of
the notice elects to submit a counter-notice; (2) the complainant then
160. See supra Part III.A.1.
161. See supra Part III.A.2.
162. See generally Grinvald, supra note 72.
163. See id. at 629–30.
164. Jennifer M. Urban & Laura Quilter, Efficient Process or “Chilling Effects”? Takedown
Notices Under Section 512 of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act, 22 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER
& HIGH TECH L.J. 621, 636–37 (2006) (“[A]lleged infringers are subject to removal of their
expressive materials, not only before a judge reviews the complaint, but likely even before they
receive notice of a complaint.  Further, while they have the opportunity to send a counternotice,
the material, once removed, must stay down at least 10-14 days according to the statute.  The
effect may be to substantially burden expressive and other individual rights.  In the case of ex-
pressive materials, this could be especially significant: ten days to two weeks may greatly dimin-
ish the value of the call to a protest, the competitive price, or the newsworthy blog entry.”
(footnote omitted)).
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files suit; and (3) a court resolves the issue.165  Shaming gives an inex-
pensive extralegal option to accused infringers: to shine a bright, pub-
lic, and critical light on the accuser.
Shaming thus gives IP bullies something to fear.  It forces them to
examine the quality of their claims because they know that they will
be shamed for overreaching and that the consequences of shaming
may be far more severe than the benefit they would gain from assert-
ing their rights.  In this way, shaming tends to offset other harmful
intellectual property phenomena that are not bound by due process,
such as the chilling effect of cease-and-desist letters.
Moreover, unlike other penalties, such as fines, shaming can help
the shamer directly.  Because the shamer is involved in punishing the
transgressor, the shamer feels a sense of agency and closure.  In fact,
when people are “fed up”—for example, as they are fed up with sharp
banking practices and white collar crime in the midst of a challenging
economy—public shaming may help restore public faith in the shamed
industry.  If shamed targets take shamers up on their invitations to
join a community of values, shamers may begin to regain trust in those
targets.
2. Many Weaknesses
In analyzing the flaws and risks of shame and shaming as regulatory
mechanisms, it is helpful to separate internal shame from external
shaming.  Each has its own weaknesses.
The chief critique of internal shame is that it is not universal.  As
discussed above, firms cannot experience shame as individuals do, and
while the individuals inside firms may be guided by their own shame
or firms may feign shame for reputational reasons, firms as unitary
entities are guided by a separate set of principles that may overcome
shame.  In addition, people who “have no shame” are simply not
bounded by the values of their community.  In a way, it is very similar
to formal law: some proportion of those bound by formal law will de-
cide to disregard it.  The difference is that formal law is more reliably
enforceable.  Shame is enforced principally through shaming—and
transgressors who have no shame are less likely to be bothered by
shaming.  For that reason, shame cannot act as a universal regulatory
mechanism.
A subtler, but no less important, critique is that shame is painful.
The same thing that makes shame effective also gives it enormous
power over those who experience it.  Imagine if everyone walked
165. See id. at 628.
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around wearing a collar that would administer a shock every time one
violated a rule of etiquette: it might be very effective at making the
world more genteel, but it would not be humane.  This is problematic
in itself, but it is especially so when one considers that what consti-
tutes shameful behavior is seldom in the discretion of the person ex-
periencing the shame.  An outside force—usually some variety of
community or family—defines what is shameful.  This gives “mob psy-
chology” enormous power to inflict emotional pain on behavioral out-
liers.166  In the broader social context, this may have the severest of
consequences, such as the suicides of those who have been socialized
to believe that homosexuality is shameful.  In the intellectual property
context, the consequences may be less severe because the behaviors
are less likely to be identity defining,—one can change one’s copying
behaviors, but not one’s sexuality—but shame is no less powerful in
defining people’s personal values in the intellectual property context
as in any other.  The tragic story of Aaron Swartz may serve as a cau-
tionary tale.  Swartz, who co-founded the Internet site Reddit and was
an outspoken free-information activist, was indicted for downloading
4.8 million academic articles from the JSTOR database with the intent
of distributing them for free via peer-to-peer file sharing sites.  Swartz
committed suicide in January after pleading not guilty.167  This high-
lights the inequality of shame and the variability of its results: Swartz
almost certainly experienced a complex set of emotions, including de-
pression and shame,168 and he took his own life.  JSTOR, which never
pursued charges against Swartz, began offering limited free access to
its materials in the wake of his death.169  The FBI has its own role in
this discourse, but it—and the individual prosecutors who pursued
Swartz in defense of their own passionately held values—may never
feel shame as Swartz did, although some have argued they should.170
This highlights a third concern with shame: it requires a static, or at
least consistently held, idea of what constitutes good-type and bad-
type behavior.  While this may be common in close-knit communities,
166. See Posner, supra note 3, at 1790–92 (explaining how collective opinion can define good-
type and bad-type behavior).
167. Caroline Bankoff, Reddit Co-Founder and JSTOR Hacker Aaron Swartz Commits Sui-
cide, N.Y. MAG. (Jan. 12, 2013, 12:50 PM), http://nymag.com/daily/intelligencer/2013/01/jstor-
hacker-aaron-swartz-commits-suicide.html.
168. See Aaron Swartz, Sick, RAW THOUGHT (Nov. 27, 2007), http://www.aaronsw.com/
weblog/verysick.
169. Bankhoff, supra note 167.
170. See, e.g., Lawrence Lessig, Prosecutor as Bully, LESSIG BLOG, V2 (Jan. 12, 2013) http://
lessig.tumblr.com/post/40347463044/prosecutor-as-bully (“Here is where we need a better sense
of justice, and shame.  For the outrageousness in this story is not just Aaron.  It is also the
absurdity of the prosecutor’s behavior.”).
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it is far from universal on a broader scale.  In fact, as the Chick-Fil-A
example demonstrates, some may celebrate what others consider
shameful.171  And even within a given community, there may be dis-
sent about the best approaches to copying and attribution.  For the
most part, this variability is a benefit because it allows for customiza-
tion of norms and fine-grained distinctions among and inside commu-
nities.  Jamband fans can value copying and sharing of live recordings
but oppose the copying of commercial releases,172 while comedians
can disapprove of copying jokes.173  Tattoo artists can approve of
purchasing and copying “flash” designs, but revile the copying of cus-
tom tattoos; they can rely on copyright protection for books of flash,
but disapprove of aggressive copyright enforcement.174  Fan fiction
communities can approve of transformative copying, but disapprove
of plagiarism.175  But it also means that at the edges of any commu-
nity, the norms and values may begin to break down.  Some roller
derby participants have begun registering their names as trademarks,
while others place a high value on the sport’s self-regulation and
would be ashamed to rely on formal law.176  Once outliers grab a foot-
hold, values can shift.  This flexibility may be good for optimizing
norms to match the needs of a given time and community, but it can
make shame an unpredictable governing tool.  When different people
have conflicting views regarding what is shameful, shame is not only
incapable of providing predictable governance, but is also guaranteed
to govern in a way that some find unacceptable.
External shaming may be even more troublesome as a regulatory
mechanism than internal shame.  First, shaming only works if some-
one hears it.  If the target never knows that it is being shamed, it will
never respond to the shaming; and if no one ever knows that the tar-
get is being shamed, there will be no harm to the target’s reputation
and no lesson imparted to the public regarding what is or should be
considered shameful.  As the Internet becomes increasingly saturated,
it becomes even more difficult for an audience to separate signal from
171. See Satran, supra note 70.
172. See Schultz, supra note 16, at 680.
173. See generally Oliar & Sprigman, supra note 10.
174. See Perzanowski, supra note 18, (manuscript at 40–43); see also Beasley, supra note 18, at
1149–50 (describing some tattoo artists’ disapproval of a trade organization that undertook ag-
gressive eBay takedowns).
175. See Casey Fiesler, Note, Everything I Need to Know I Learned from Fandom: How Ex-
isting Social Norms Can Help Shape the Next Generation of User-Generated Content, 10 VAND. J.
ENT. & TECH. L. 729, 752–54 (2008).
176. Fagundes, supra note 19, at 1129–30, 1137–38.
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noise.  This means that the effectiveness of shaming as a regulatory
mechanism may end up depending as much on luck as on merit.
In addition, shaming is less effective in communities where identity
is plastic.177  If the shamed target is anonymous or can easily change
identity, the target will not perceive the threat or feel the sting of
reputational harm.  Many online settings permit or encourage ano-
nymity; in such settings, shaming is largely ineffective.  In pseudony-
mous societies—for example, many online communities—shaming is
more effective, but only if pseudonyms are persistent identifiers of a
single entity.178  Although some of these communities have cultures of
reciprocity that most members follow, those members must be guided
and governed by their own consciences and internal shame, since
there is no mechanism for shaming (or even identifying) those without
persistent identities.  In those settings, formal remedies—and the sub-
poena power that accompanies them—are far more effective against
those without shame.
Even more problematic is shaming’s unpredictability.  If the target
does not share the values of the shamer, or perceives its actions as
justified, the shaming will not generate the shamer’s desired reac-
tion.179 Most IP owners likely wish to avoid being branded as bullies,
but others might actually want to be seen as litigious, “scary” adversa-
ries.180  In addition, if the target does not believe that the shamer’s
values are popular enough to make a meaningful reputational differ-
ence, the target can blithely ignore the shamer’s efforts.181  For this
reason, shaming is likely to be ineffective against targets whose mar-
ket success does not depend on reputation.  Shaming-based collective
action can be very effective, as it was with the SOPA–PIPA demon-
strations that shamed web intermediaries and congresspeople.  But
the effectiveness of those demonstrations depended largely on the fact
that users may have choices about internet service providers and that
congresspeople depend entirely on voters.  In contrast, shaming cam-
177. See Andrea Vanina Arias, Comment, Life, Liberty, and the Pursuit of Swords and Armor:
Regulating the Theft of Virtual Goods, 57 EMORY L.J. 1301, 1340 (2008) (discussing the ineffec-
tiveness of shaming as a remedy for theft of intangible goods in communities where identity is
anonymous or ephemeral).
178. See Rothchild, supra note 66, at 967–68 (describing how punishment by shaming and
banishment was ineffective in policing the LambdaMOO community when a punished wrong-
doer could—and did—immediately rejoin the community post-punishment by using a different
pseudonym).
179. See Litowitz, supra note 45, at 55; Rothchild, supra note 66, at 968.
180. See Gallagher, supra note 136, at 494–95 (noting that some rights holders have a strong
aversion to publicity surrounding enforcement activities, while others “relish their reputation for
being an aggressive IP enforcer”).
181. See Maibom, supra note 24, at 569–71; see also Posner & Rasmusen, supra note 3, at 374.
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paigns against Facebook have been largely ineffective, likely because
Facebook perceives no ill effect from violating its customers’ norms.182
Facebook no doubt knows that its users believe it should be ashamed
of its practice of shifting privacy policies with little or no warning, but
Facebook also knows that its market power depends on the network
effect, not on reputation.183  In this way, even the loudest shaming
campaign may fall on deaf ears.
Moreover, while shaming campaigns may begin as attempts to inte-
grate an outsider into a community, reintegrative shaming depends on
the potential for forgiveness, which may not be forthcoming after a
viral shaming campaign.  Many members of the Ravelry community
continued to revile the USOC long after its public apology.184  A tar-
get looking at the Ravelry example could reasonably ask, “Why
bother apologizing, if I will continue to be despised?” The result is
that while shaming might spread values to shaming targets through
integration or reintegration, it could just as easily lead to recalci-
trance, making the target all the more likely to re-offend.
In fact, external shaming can backfire for a number of reasons.
While shaming may infuse public opinion with the idea that a particu-
lar behavior is “bad,” it can have the opposite effect by highlighting
how widespread the behavior is.  This is particularly likely if cam-
paigns attempt to condemn multiple targets for the behavior before
public opinion has condemned it.  If a particular type of behavior is a
frequent target of shaming campaigns, it could lead targets to believe
their behavior puts them in good (or at least numerous) company
rather than bad.185  For that reason, using shaming to manipulate
targets’ shame may have unpredictable results: increased formal en-
forcement may actually undermine norms by signaling that transgres-
sion is common or that compliance is “uncool.”186  This may be one
reason why shaming campaigns have not eradicated peer-to-peer file
sharing: those who engage in it may believe that “everyone is doing
it.”
182. Cf. Posner & Rasmusen, supra note 3, at 374 (“If the violator . . . anticipates no bad
effects on him from the reception of the criticisms by other people, the criticisms will fail as
sanctions for the criticized act.”).
183. See Morganstern, supra note 67, at 195–97 (discussing mixed effectiveness of collective
shaming action in influencing Facebook privacy policies).
184. See, e.g., Memmott, supra note 153 (“Early Reactions to the Apology Aren’t Positive”).
185. See Litowitz, supra note 45, at 56.
186. See Posner, supra note 3, at 1791–92, 1804, 1813 (discussing unpredictability of shaming
as an enforcement mechanism); see also Steven A. Hetcher, Norm Proselytizers Create a Privacy
Entitlement in Cyberspace, 16 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 877, 879–80 (2001).
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External shaming may also backfire as a result of rage and rebel-
lion.187  Although some proportion of shamers may want to integrate
(or reintegrate) an offender into a community of norms, their shaming
efforts may ultimately push the target away.  Viral shaming campaigns
lack a central control mechanism and therefore find it difficult to send
a consistently integrative or reintegrative message188—and even if
they succeed in sending such a message, the target may not hear or
appreciate what the shamers have in mind.  So unless the target de-
pends heavily on the shamer’s community for some reason (e.g.,
profit), the target can become an “outsider” who will not be interested
in integration or reintegration and will not be harmed by ostracism,
shunning, or other disintegrative shaming techniques.189  Thus, exter-
nal shaming can create rogues who feel they owe nothing to the com-
munity and can therefore transgress with relative impunity.190  Indeed,
empirical studies associate shaming sanctions that involve stigmatizing
the target with higher rates of re-offense.191
On the other hand, reactions to shaming can be equally powerful
and potentially destructive in the direction of compliance.  If the tar-
get does share the shamer’s values or the audience reacts strongly to
the shaming, the results may be extremely damaging or painful.  In
social science parlance, “either one finds [shaming sanctions] easy to
ignore, or one finds them particularly harsh, and cripplingly diminish-
ing of self-esteem.  The effectiveness of such sanctions on people of
the first sort is nil; with respect to the second sort, the effect is likely to
be overkill, and hard to predict.”192  While the former speaks only to
shaming’s effectiveness, the latter raises what may be a deeper con-
cern: It grants the shamer a potentially overwhelming power to hurt
targets and influence values.  On one hand, this is powerfully democ-
ratizing; entities with very little financial power can shape public opin-
ion effectively through shaming campaigns, as Patent TrollTracker and
its ilk have influenced public opinion against patent assertion entities.
On the other hand, it can lead to unfair results—especially when
shaming is spread virally by a public with incomplete information.
187. See Raffaele Rodogno, supra note 3, at 434 (discussing relationship between humiliation
and negative effects in connection with shaming penalties).
188. For example, Ravelry could not exert control over its members’ outraged and angry
responses.
189. Posner & Rasmusen, supra note 3, at 380.
190. See McAlinden, supra note 78, at 374 (discussing the disintegrative effects of naming and
shaming sex offenders).
191. See Tangney et al., supra note 40, at 709 (discussing studies, including 2007 correlational
study of 652 tax evaders).
192. Ullmann-Margalit, supra note 44, at 435 (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
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YouTube contains many videos shaming “joke-stealers” whose popu-
larity and careers may be severely injured by the shaming, even if they
independently, and thus innocently, invented the same jokes.  This can
lead to lasting, unearned reputational harm.193
This harm occurs without regard for due process or proportionality.
It is, in essence, vigilantism.  In the words of John Rothchild, “[A]
regime of . . . vigilantism is not an entirely attractive prospect.”194
Vigilantism may result in justice, but it is uncontrolled.  It is ironic that
the shaming campaign to defeat SOPA and PIPA focused largely on
highlighting the proposed legislation’s creation of an Internet “black-
list” without due process—considering that the campaign essentially
blacklisted suspected SOPA and PIPA supporters without any due
process.195  Blacklisting and watchlisting may be effective shaming
techniques, but they can also lead to unsubstantiated “witch-hunting”
and disproportionate punishment.196
In the intellectual property context, self-policing might mediate this
danger.  A study of letters submitted to the Chilling Effects database
indicated that individuals who had (or believed they had) a strong de-
fense to infringement allegations were more likely to submit their no-
tices to the database.  Thus, it appears that the shaming effect of the
database is directed at bullies rather than tarring all IP enforcers with
the same shaming brush.197  But self-policing depends on shared val-
ues.  When a group of shamers has a variety of views, the least reason-
193. See, e.g., deadfrogcomedy, Judd Apatow vs Denis Leary: Is This Joke Stealing, YOUTUBE
(July 16, 2008), http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=zUU3Lvs_OxM; deadfrogcomedy, Whose
Joke Is It? Carlos Mencia? D.L. Hughley? George Lopez?, YOUTUBE (Feb. 19, 2007), http://
www.youtube.com/watch?v=kPuu_VE7KOA.
194. Rothchild, supra note 66, at 965–66 (describing collateral damage from vigilante over-
enforcement of spam norms on Internet bulletin boards); see also Whitman, supra note 3, at
1059.
195. See Doctorow, supra note 149 (shaming legislators who supported the bills); see also
Gibbs, supra note 149 (shaming websites that did not participate in public demonstration against
bills); Wilhelm, supra note 149 (shaming a corporate supporter of the bills).
196. See generally Daniel J. Steinbock, Designating the Dangerous: From Blacklists to Watch
Lists, 30 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 65 (2006) (discussing dangers of blacklisting and watchlisting).  I
understand that by criticizing shaming as a tool for encouraging IP forbearance and preventing
overreaching IP assertion, I am postulating a market failure of sorts—arguing that “more infor-
mation” may not always be better.  And to the extent that shaming disseminates accurate infor-
mation about shaming targets, it is hard to dispute that it may help consumers make informed
decisions.  That, in itself, would be a benefit of shaming, if it were true.  It may not be: the public
may over- or undervalue shaming information, and may reach a point of “information overload”
when presented with complete information.  But even assuming that the consuming public ab-
sorbs information perfectly, shaming may generate negative externalities, including dispropor-
tionate, unpredictable, or perverse reactions from the shamed targets.
197. See Urban & Quilter, supra note 164, at 642 (reporting analysis of Chilling Effects
submissions).
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able of those views may be the loudest.  For example, when the cyber-
vigilante group Anonymous becomes involved in a shaming campaign,
reputational harm is only the beginning: the group hacks corporate
websites and conducts denial-of-service attacks and other cyber pun-
ishments.198  The result is that the target cannot retaliate and may not
even be able to defend itself.  Anonymous’s brand of activity may
backfire as a method of behavior control; studies show that shaming
actually hinders social behavior when it imposes a harsh cost on the
transgressor.199  But even if it effectively disseminates social values, it
imposes the most extreme values and does so at a very high cost.
The upshot of these considerations is that both shame and shaming
are problematic as regulatory tools.  Of the two, shame may be prefer-
able.  Although shame only works on a portion of the population, it
is—at least for that portion—both more predictable and more effec-
tive than shaming.  This is consistent with social science research with
computer-simulated societies, which indicates that introducing
shame—teaching people to be ashamed of certain anti-social behav-
iors—“is more effective for the achievement of pro-social behavior
than increasing the [shaming-based or other] punishment to non-com-
plying agents.”200
Ultimately, both have benefits and drawbacks.  Shame is an excel-
lent mechanism for enforcing norms in relatively close-knit communi-
ties of individuals or very small firms.  Shaming may currently be the
best approach to regulating certain behaviors such as IP bullying and
may be particularly helpful in generating a discourse about what be-
haviors should be considered shameful.  But as a replacement for for-
mal law, or even as a mechanism for adjusting the boundaries of
formal law, neither shame nor shaming is a panacea.
IV. NORMATIVE IMPLICATIONS
Clearly, neither shame nor shaming should replace formal intellec-
tual property law.  They are too unpredictable, risky, and potentially
harmful.  But it is undeniable, and perhaps beneficial, that they aug-
ment and shape the effects of formal law.  We can look to current uses
of shame and shaming in the intellectual property context to learn
198. See, e.g., Cliff Edwards et al., Sony Caught Up in Cyber War with Indignant Hackers:
Company with Security Once Considered ‘Robust’ Now Dealing with Constant Breaches,
CHARLESTON DAILY MAIL (May 30, 2011), available at http://www.highbeam.com/doc/1P2-
28794321.html; Internet Strikes Back: Anonymous’ Operation Megaupload Explained, RT.COM
(March 7, 2012, 12:28 PM), http://rt.com/usa/anonymous-barrettbrown-sopa-megaupload-241/.
199. Jaffe, supra note 27, at 95–96.
200. Id. at 96.
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something about how the public wants intellectual property law to
work.
First, we must acknowledge that formal intellectual property laws
cannot, and have not, done the job alone.  Shame and shaming have
always been part of the intellectual property landscape and are in-
creasingly important in moderating the effects of formal protection.
This implies that formal law may not be the ideal mechanism for pro-
tecting all varieties of intellectual property in all circumstances.  In
negative-space communities, a lack of formal protection seems to ben-
efit creation and innovation,201 at least partly because participants in
these communities are governed by customized rule sets enforced by
conscience and shame.  These communities seem to have little diffi-
culty creating effective systems that meet their own needs.202  Some
restrict copying; others encourage it with specific provisos such as at-
tribution norms.203  The lack of formal protection does not appear to
chill creation or innovation; in fact, it seems to encourage it, especially
in settings like academia, cuisine, fashion, open-source software, and
fandom, where “creative copying,”—building upon the works of
others to create something new—advances the creative needs of the
community.  The norms of these communities are more flexible than
formal law, as they are able to change as technology or prevailing
markets do.  In addition, community members likely follow these
norms more assiduously, both because of the power of shame and also
because, unlike formal laws made by distant politicians, community
members can feel like they had some hand in creating and reinforcing
them.
I do not suggest that we should start repealing intellectual property
laws because shame will do all the work.  However, particularly when
considering whether to implement new protections and whether to im-
plement carve-out exceptions to current protections, it is important
for lawmakers to consider whether formal enactments will add value
beyond shame-based enforcement.
How do we tell the difference between situations where laws are
necessary and situations where shame should stand in their place?
The discussion above provides some of those answers.  Shame cannot
be the sole governing mechanism when the transgressors are likely to
be firms or other collective entities.  But when individuals are the
201. See Rosenblatt, supra note 99, at 348–50; see also Elizabeth L. Rosenblatt, Intellectual
Property’s Negative Space: Beyond the Utilitarian, 40 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 441, 447 (2013).
202. This is consistent with research showing that cooperative (coordination) norms arise or-
ganically when they suit collective needs. See Hetcher, supra note 186, at 902–03.
203. See supra Part III.A.1.
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most likely transgressors, then formal law may not be necessary.  Sec-
ond, social science literature indicates that shame and shaming are
most effective when reintegrative shaming is possible and when the
participants are interdependent on each other.  This implies that
shame and shaming may do much of the work of formal law in rela-
tively close-knit communities where members are likely to communi-
cate with each other and may depend on each other for creative or
inventive purposes.204 This includes communities like those discussed
above that involve creative copying and countercultures in which be-
longing to the community and adhering to its values becomes part of
the participant’s identity, such as sharing or free-information move-
ments, athletics, performance magic, stand-up comedy, or roller
derby.  Ultimately, the equilibria of low-IP spaces may not be as frag-
ile as one might fear.205  In a world of shame, shaming, and interde-
pendence, there are high costs, both emotionally and reputationally,
for “going rogue.”
While shame and shaming are good at regulating interactions within
communities, they are far from ideal for regulating interactions among
communities.206  As we have seen above, different communities hold
different, and often inconsistent, values.  Take pro-copying or free-in-
formation norms: while these work well within the sharing commu-
nity, they do not necessarily reflect the needs or values of initial
creators.  Free-information activists may wish to copy without any re-
spect or understanding for the needs of initial creators, and therefore
find no shame in harming them.  In that instance, formal law is re-
quired.  As a more concrete example, many fan fiction writers strongly
favor transformative copying, as long as it includes attribution.207
They not only write transformative works, but also welcome others to
remix (and attribute) their fanworks.208  Many commercial authors,
however, feel differently.209  They may not want the characters they
204. Here, I am referring to communities in which the members are likely to interact with
each other.
205. See Dreyfuss, supra note 112.
206. See generally Jeremy A. Schachter, That’s My Joke . . . Art . . . Trick!: How the Internal
Norms of IP Communities Are Ineffective Against Extra-Community Misappropriation, 12 VA.
SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 63 (2012).
207. See Fiesler, supra note 175, at 752–54.
208. See id.
209. In 2012, for example, the estate of Marion Zimmer Bradley sued fan-author Mary Battle,
asserting that her works infringed the author’s copyrights and trademark rights.  Complaint for
Copyright and Trademark Infringement at 3–4, Marion Zimmer Bradley Literary Works Trust v.
Battle, No. 3:12-cv-00073 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 5, 2012).  The same estate contacted the Organization
for Transformative Works’ “Archive Of Our Own,” asserting that noncommercial fan fiction
stories posted there infringed Bradley’s trademark and copyright rights. See Email from Ann
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invented to be put in new situations, with or without attribution.  Be-
cause these communities disagree about what constitutes shameful be-
havior, shame will not adequately govern their interactions, and
formal law is necessary to determine whose view “wins” and under
what circumstances.  For fans and commercial authors, the law does
just that:  the Copyright Act and its fair use provision provide parame-
ters under which fans can make transformative use of commercial au-
thors’ works.210  Shame augments formal law to govern fans’ behavior
among each other (copying is fine, plagiarism is not) and with the
commercial authors (showing them fan fiction is generally taboo).
Shaming also comes into play, as fans may shame authors or copyright
holders who wish to enforce their copyrights against fair uses or at-
tempt to enforce rights they do not have.211  This forces rights holders
to consider the strength of their claims before asserting them, because
a weak claim is more likely than a strong one to generate reputational
harm via shaming.212  In that setting, therefore, shame and shaming
augment law but would not adequately replace it.
While shame and shaming should not be the only mechanisms gov-
erning inter-community intellectual property practices, they are still
valuable in the inter-community setting, both for governing and for
instructing lawmakers about the appropriate boundaries for formal
protection.  From a governance standpoint, shaming stems the gradual
accretion of rights by offsetting the effects of risk aversion and over-
reaching.  Rights holders will inevitably seek to expand protection by
asserting rights they do not have or accusing non-infringing activities.
Victims of such IP bullying have little formal recourse: they may re-
spond with motions to dismiss, declaratory judgment actions, or anti-
SLAPP motions,213 but doing so requires significant expense and at-
tention, especially considering that bullying victims may have done
nothing wrong.  In that setting, shifting some of the risk to the bully—
the risk of being shamed—may make bullies think twice about over-
Sharp, Tr., Marion Zimmer Bradley Literary Works Trust, to Rebecca L. Tushnet, Professor of
Law, Georgetown University Law Center (Sept. 26, 2012) (on file with author).
210. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 101, 107 (2006).
211. See, for example, the FreeSherlock campaign waged against the Arthur Conan Doyle
Estate’s threats against transformative authors, based upon expired copyrights. See FREE SHER-
LOCK!, http://www.free-sherlock.com (last visited Sept. 24, 2013).
212. See Gallagher, supra note 136, at 495–96 (describing attorney’s consideration of norms
and shaming in deciding whether to assert rights against fan sites).
213. For a helpful explanation of anti-SLAPP (Strategic Lawsuit Against Public Participation)
statutes, see Irina D. Manta, Bearing Down on Trademark Bullies, 22 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP.
MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 853, 862 (2012).
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reaching.214  In the creative copying context, for example, this might
offset rights holders’ coercive power and allow creative copiers the
freedom to pursue their art.
From a normative standpoint, shaming demonstrates where the law
itself may overreach.  When targets are shamed for exercising their
own intellectual property rights against plausible opponents—like the
shaming of Apple’s aggressive patent strategies215 or Monster Energy
Company’s aggressive trademark strategies216—it may signal that the
problem is not with the rights holder, but with laws so broad that
rights holders may use them to make costly and potentially chilling
claims.  Shaming campaigns identify when formal law ill-serves partic-
ular communities and when it has fallen out of line with prevailing
social norms and preferences.
The prevalence of shaming in response to overreaching intellectual
property assertions may also signal the need to shift power to accused
infringers early in the cease-and-desist and litigation processes.  As
discussed above, under current law, shaming is often the best option
for small-scale accused infringers when faced with weak or baseless
threats from larger-scale rights holders.217  Although shaming creates
a workable escape valve for the bullied, it is flawed: shaming cam-
paigns may not reach the desired audience, and if they do, they may
backfire in a number of ways.218  Even if we are content to leave intra-
community governance to shame, it is risky to leave inter-community
governance to shaming.  With that in mind, lawmakers may want to
consider formalizing other early escape valves for accused infringers,
214. See Armendariz, supra note 143, at 1277–78 (relating a story about how Ford’s social
media maven Scott Monty responded to shaming by backing away from trademark over-
enforcement).
215. See, e.g., Henry Blodget, Apple Sues Samsung for ‘Slide-to-Unlock’ and Other Ludicrous
iPhone Patent Violations, BUSINESSINSIDER (Feb. 12, 2012, 8:46 PM), http://www.businessinsider.
com/apple-sues-samsumg-for-slide-to-unlock-2012-2; Mark Gibbs, Apple’s Ridiculous Patent,
FORBES (July 27, 2012, 4:45 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/markgibbs/2012/07/27/apples-ridic-
ulous-patent/; Ryan Moore, Apple Bullying Samsung Some More [Patent], ANDROID COLISEUM
(Dec. 29, 2012, 11:21 AM), http://www.androidcoliseum.com/2012/12/apple-bullying-samsung-
some-more-patent.html;  Aleksi Tzatzev, The ‘Magic Glove’ and 8 Other Ridiculous Inventions
Patented by Apple, BUSINESS INSIDER (Oct. 20, 2012, 11:00 AM), http://www.businessinsider.
com/9-of-apples-strangest-patents-2012-10?op=1.
216. See, e.g., #FightTheMonster, HACKETTANDTIGER.COM (Aug. 10, 2012), http://hacket-
tandtiger.com/fightthemonster/; Mike Masnick, Monster Energy Drink Hires Trademark Bully
To Go After  Beverage Review Site, TECHDIRT (Oct. 19, 2009, 12:15 PM), http://www.techdirt.
com/articles/20091019/0420536584.shtml; Nicole Putnam, Monster Energy Company: Stop Trade-
mark Bullying MonsterFishKeepers.com!, CHANGE.ORG, http://www.change.org/petitions/mon-
ster-energy-company-stop-trademark-bullying-monsterfishkeepers-com (last visited Sept. 24,
2013) (online petition).
217. See supra Part III.B.1.
218. See supra Part III.B.2.
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such as broader misuse doctrines, causes of action for “baseless
threats,” or “anti-troll” fee-shifting legislation.219  In addition,
lawmakers and courts may wish to consider requiring formal apologies
as remedies for abuse of process by overreaching plaintiffs.  The latter
would harness not only the power of shame and shaming, but also the
power of plaintiffs’ risk aversion.  The risk of having to make a public
apology might more effectively prevent IP bullying than would the
possibility of merely losing a case or having to pay an opponent’s fees.
Considering the power of shame and shaming, and the fact that they
are already discursively intertwined with intellectual property law,
lawmakers may also want to consider the benefits and drawbacks of
creating “apology” or “censure” remedies for infringement of formal
law.  The pros and cons are manifest: formal shaming penalties would
signal the shamefulness of intellectual property infringement, and
could provide opportunities for reintegration of infringers and emo-
tional vindication for rights holders—but these penalties could back-
fire and further establish a class of intellectual property “rebels.”  A
full discussion of shaming sanctions as formal remedies for infringe-
ment is beyond the scope of this Article, but it should be noted that
China’s copyright and trademark laws include official censure and
apology as punishments for infringement.220
In the end, however, examining shame and shaming in the intellec-
tual property context may be most valuable as a tool for determining
what people value.  Shame and shaming modify formal law to con-
form to popular conceptions of what the law should be, especially
when those conceptions differ from what the law is.  Formal law re-
219. The benefits and drawbacks of such approaches are beyond the scope of this Article; I
only suggest that, considering their relationship with anti-bully shaming, they are worth
considering.
220. See Copyright Law of the People’s Republic of China, STATE INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
OFFICE,  http://english.sipo.gov.cn/laws/relatedlaws/200804/t20080416_380362.html (“Anyone
who commits any of the following acts of infringement shall bear civil liability for such remedies
as ceasing the infringing act, eliminating the effects of the act, making an apology or paying
compensation for damages, depending on the circumstances . . . .”); see also Anne M. Wall,
Intellectual Property Protection in China: Enforcing Trademark Rights, 17 MARQ. SPORTS L.
REV. 341, 362 (2006) (describing Chinese formal copyright remedy of apology, which “brings
with it the significant social stigma of shaming,” and noting that Chinese courts have increasingly
included the apology remedy in orders); Peter K. Yu, From Pirates to Partners: Protecting Intel-
lectual Property in China in the Twenty-First Century, 50 AM. U. L. REV. 131, 187 n.312 (2000)
(describing public shaming as a remedy that may be “unconventional” to the American audience
but has the potential to be very effective).  As a generalization, however, Chinese culture is
thought to be considerably more concerned with reputation and loss of “face” than American
culture, and therefore, the threat of official censure may not be as effective a deterrent of behav-
ior in the United States as it is in China. See Heidi Hansen Kalscheur, Note, About “Face”:
Using Moral Rights to Increase Copyright Enforcement in China, 39 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 513,
524 (2012).
46 DEPAUL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 63:1
flects the power structure of legislative governance and common law,
which rely on influence and compromise to generate rules that may fit
poorly in individualized situations.221  In contrast, shame and shaming
reflect a different power structure: a critical mass of individually pow-
erless people can collectively define and enforce what is shameful, and
they can do so in a far more situational, granular manner.  Shame and
shaming silence the minority, but formal law may compromise away
the values of the majority.  Neither system reflects the full picture of
society, but to ignore shame and shaming is to ignore the will of the
people.  By examining what is shameful and who is targeted for sham-
ing, one can learn what the critical mass wants from its laws.
The role of shame and shaming in creating and governing negative
spaces implies that people gravitate toward “set points” of intellectual
property protection.  By examining what people find to be shameful,
and what they shame others for, we can see that people’s collective
moral intuition rebels against a complete lack of protection while also
resisting a level of protection so high that it chills creation.  An exami-
nation of shame and shaming also teaches us that the level and details
of this optimal set point may not be constant: Some areas of creation
may demand a high level of sharing. In others, attribution may be im-
portant. In another, even a small amount of copying may be too much.
Considering the power and inevitability of shame, and the unpre-
dictability of shaming, one may conclude that the best outcome would
permit shame-based “IP without IP” systems to flourish, while imple-
menting policies that reduce the need for public shaming of those who
enforce their intellectual property rights.   Regardless of the outcome,
however, lawmakers should take note and strive for balance between
the “mob justice” of shame and shaming and the one-size-fits all re-
gime of formal law.
V. CONCLUSION
For too long, lawmakers and scholars have ignored the power of
shame and shaming to shape intellectual property behavior, as well as
their potential to guide the path of formal intellectual property law.
Shame and shaming not only reinforce formal law as they do in other
areas, but also augment that law.  Together, they help to create and
maintain intellectual property negative spaces where innovation and
creation thrive without significant formal intellectual property protec-
tion or enforcement.  In areas beyond the reach of formal intellectual
property protection, shame helps define the boundaries of informal or
221. See Burk & Lemley, supra note 131, at 1577 (2003).
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norms-based intellectual property practices.  In areas governed by for-
mal intellectual property protection, shaming helps define the bound-
aries of rights holders’ enforcement forbearance.
These effects adjust the boundaries of formal intellectual property
protection in a more finely tuned way than formal law can, but they
do so at a potentially high cost.  Shame is extremely powerful—more
so than formal law—but painful, and it is ineffective as a tool for regu-
lating those who do not experience it.  Shaming may influence the be-
havior of more targets, but has notable disadvantages, including not
only pain, but also unpredictable results.  Despite those flaws, shame
and shaming possess marked advantages over formal law for regulat-
ing copying behavior.  Most notably, shame and shaming are flexible
and reflect the needs of the communities they govern, unlike the mon-
olithic, one-size-fits-all dictates of formal law.  Shame and shaming are
not suitable substitutes for formal law, nor are they miracle cures for
law’s failings, but they may act as guideposts for determining where to
draw the lines of formal legal protection.
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